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Summary
Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) represents a novel paper where a credit conditions
index (CCI) is estimated for the UK. The CCI is intended to capture supply-side shifts that are
due to structural changes and other shocks to the financial sector, controlling for e.g. changes
in the interest rate or the level of output. This index will therefore allow researchers to control
for the institutional development in their empirical work and take into account how some of
the mechanisms in the credit market can have changed over time. The index of Fernandez-
Corugedo and Muellbauer seems to capture the main developments in the UK including the
extensive deregulation of the credit market during the 1980s. Succeeding works (e.g. Aron,
Muellbauer, and Murphy (2008)) have proven that the including the CCI improves the perfor-
mance of some econometric models.
If the methodology of credit condition indices is to gain increased relevance and usage more
empirical evidence is needed. The main objective of this thesis is therefore to estimate a CCI
for Norway, following the setup and method of Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006).
To do so I go through several steps. Chapter 2 outlines how the regulation of Norwegian credit
markets has developed since the 1970s. I have combined various sources in order to provide a
relatively detailed summary of the deregulation process that took place. As far as I am aware of,
there exists no other unified presentation of this kind, making this chapter important in its own
respect. This also motivates that a more detailed version of Chapter 2 will be made available in
Krogh (2010, forthcoming). In Chapter 3 I consider what tendencies in credit conditions that
can be drawn from the mortgage survey conducted by Finanstilsynet. The purpose of Chapters
2-3 is to provide sound qualitative evidence for the structural development of the Norwegian
credit markets since the 1970s. The requirement for a sensible estimate of the CCI must be that
it is in line with this qualitative information.
Chapter 4 contains the model I will use to estimate the CCI and also sketch what I think
the CCI will look like. I formulate a system of two equations to explain the development in
secured and unsecured debt relative to income. Chapter 5 explains how the model is estimated
using a maximum likelihood approach and it also provides some considerations of practical
problems that may arise when the model is estimated. The end result of this chapter is a
Stata commanda that is tailor-made to estimate the model. The description of the maximum
likelihood framework applied and the derivations that accompany it can be useful for other
researchers that want use their own maximum likelihood codes to estimate a nonlinear SUR
model. This can be relevant if their model entails a variation that is not permitted by the
standard commands that exist.
The estimates are presented in Chapter 6. I detect long-run relationships that have fairly
aAll estimations have been performed with the statistical software Stata (StataCorp, 2007; Rel. 10).
reasonable coefficients, but with some exceptions. The implied CCI has a shape that matches
most of the ex ante expectations that I have, given the evidence in Chapters 2-3, but both
the CCI and the demographic variable seem to get too large coefficients in the equation for
unsecured debt. I judge my results to represent a very useful first step, but I do think that the
model probably ignores an important interaction between secured and unsecured debt that has
led to a shift from the latter to the former type of debt. I describe how the weaknesses of my
results point in this direction. Chapter 7 concludes.
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1 Introduction
The fact that financial markets matter, and that their apparent instability can lead to events that
have grave consequences, is a recurrent issue in both economics as a field and in the public de-
bate. The financial crisis, which took off after the collapse of Lehman Brothers September 15th
2008, gave the world a reminder of how dire the results might become when the situation gets
out of hand. Norway has been relatively shielded from the current crisis, but the experiences
from the banking crisis in the early 1990s are still fresh in memory.
The recent events will undoubtedly spur the interest for financial instability and initiate
further research related to its consequences for the macroeconomy.1 In this respect it is also
relevant to investigate how financial markets have developed over time, in particular the effects
of the extensive financial deregulation that has taken place in many European countries since
the 1980s, including Norway. According to Debelle (2004) the process of deregulation (which
helped reduce the incidence of credit constraints) has been one of the main reasons for the
increase in household borrowing in Western countries the last decades. However, this argument
is only qualitative and it would be of great importance to have some notion of how strong
quantitative effects one can attribute to financial reform and to deregulation. Furthermore, it has
been argued by Goodhart, Hofmann, and Segoviano (2004) that the process of deregulation and
also the creation of somewhat procyclical capital requirements have changed how the business
cycle works and led to more prominent boom-bust cycles. If this is true, great interest would
be attached to a measure of when the most important institutional changes took place. It is
therefore a need for methods that can help us quantify the relative size of shocks to the credit
markets and also provide us with some idea of when these shocks occurred.
One way of quantifying the effects of deregulation and other unobservable variables affect-
ing the credit markets could be to assume that the impact of these factors can be summarized in
one single credit conditions index (CCI). This index would, if successfully estimated, capture
supply-side shifts such as those stemming from financial liberalization. Further, it would also
partly capture shifts we would expect to occur in the midst of a financial crisis. The purpose
of it, as I see it, is mainly to have an instrument that allows you to control for the historical
development and hence improve your ability to explain events ex post.2
1See Goodhart, Sunrirad, and Tsomocos (2004) for an example of a work that acknowledged the challenge
already prior to the crisis, and Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro (2010) for an example of how the "mainstream"
has intentions of following.
2An alternative approach has been explored by the developers of various financial condition indices (FCIs).
Hatzius, Hooper, Mishkin, Schoenholtz, and Watson (2010) describes seven FCIs that have been constructed by
different institutions, among others Goldman Sachs, the Federal Reserve and the OECD. It also constructs a new
FCI based on an unbalanced panel of 45 different financial indicators. The FCIs vary with respect to how they
are constructed, but their common objective is to summarize the information about the future development of the
economy contained in various financial variables, like various stock indices, interest rates and yield curves. This
makes the FCIs a broader type of indices than the CCIs. As I interpret them, the value of an FCI at any point
1
Muellbauer and Murphy (1993) was one of the first attempts to estimate an index measuring
the extent of financial liberalization. In this paper they consider annual UK data for the period
of 1967 - 1990. Based on an assumption that lenders (or borrowers) aim for a constant debt-
service to income ratio, they regress the loan to value ratio for first-time buyers on the log of
the tax adjusted mortgage interest rate, the log of the house price to income and time dummies
for all the years in the data set. The dummy-coefficients are set to zero in those years the degree
of financial liberalization can be assumed to have remained constant, and the resulting financial
liberalization index is basically the sum of all the dummies (times their estimated coefficient)
plus a set of control variables. The index is then used to allow for a time-varying wealth effect
in a consumption model.
Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) develops the method from Muellbauer and
Murphy (1993) further. They have a rich dataset which they use to construct 10 different
indicators for the credit conditions in the UK. A 10 equation system is formulated and a wide
range of controls are included as explanatory variables for the indicators. Then, to extract a
CCI they assume that there is a common, but unobservable, variable affecting all the indicators.
This variable is assumed to take the form of a "spline function" plus some policy variables. The
spline function is a piecewise linear function that changes slope only in the first quarter of the
year (for a more precise definition, see Chapter 4).
Two of the credit indicators used are data on (the log of) mortgage and non-mortgage house-
hold debt. In addition they have a comprehensive set of micro data with more than a million ob-
servations of mortgages for first-time buyers. They use this to find loan-to-value ratios (LVRs)
and loan-to-income ratios (LIRs) for first-time buyers. They separate the data by age (less than
27 and 27 plus) and region (North and South) such that they end up with 8 indicators in addition
to the two mentioned above.3
The authors include prior assumptions regarding the slope of the spline function in some
of the years (based on qualitative information regarding the liberalization process in the UK)
and also on the sign of other variables (based on theoretical considerations). The system is
estimated as a nonlinear Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model. The priors are im-
posed sequentially such that coefficients violating their priors are set to zero (if several violates
simultaneously, the one violating its restriction "the most" is first set to zero). The resulting
CCI is illustrated in Figure 1.1. It has a reasonable shape and is in line with the institutional
development presented in the paper.
A second work that contributes with CCI estimates is Blake and Muellbauer (2009), see
in time reflects how current financial shocks should affect future economic activity ex ante. This approach is
therefore related, but clearly distinct from the CCI strategy. Future work should consider to clarify the connection
between CCIs and FCIs.
3For the estimation purposes, they assume that both the LIR and LVR of each group are logistically distributed
such that log-odds ratios for LIRs larger than 2.5 and LVRs larger than 0.9 can be constructed.
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Figure 1.1: The CCI from Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006).
The line labelled "No interaction" is the standard CCI, that labelled "Interaction" is the result when the CCI is
interacted with a risk measure. "rabmr" is the real mortgage interest rate.
also Oxford Economics (2009). This report gives estimates for house price and mortgage stock
equations for several countries, and in that context also estimates of some form of credit con-
ditions indices. For the UK they have the CCI of Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006),
and they extend the index to 2008 using a "non-linear spline function" – the 4 quarter moving
average of the spline function used by Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer. The coefficients
are estimated in a system of two equations; one equation for house prices and one for mortgage
debt.
In addition, to make the UK results comparable with the results for the countries where no
other indices are available, they estimate a new CCI for the UK based on this non-linear spline
in the full sample. The resulting index tracks the pattern of the original CCI fairly well. This is
a very interesting finding and it indicates that the "structural trend" detected by the framework
of Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) is quite robust. Similar two-equation systems
are estimated for several other countries, including among others Germany, Spain and Italy,
resulting in credit condition indices for these countries as well.
In his study of house prices in Australia, Williams (2009) uses the same methodology as
Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) to extract a variable for financial liberalization,
but here the CCI is extracted from a single equation for housing prices. The CCI is constructed
as a trend which is permitted to have break-points at 3 places. The positions of these break-
points are guided by his estimates of a stochastic, unobserved trend from the STAMP software
(Koopman, Harvey, Doornik, and Shephard, 2000). With only three break-points his CCI has
a "simpler" shape than the UK index of Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) but it fits
well with the institutional background for Australia described in the paper.
An application that illustrates the usefulness of a credit conditions index is Aron, Muell-
bauer, andMurphy (2008). The strategy of this paper is to apply the CCI estimated by Fernandez-
3
Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) in a consumption function. Changes in the credit conditions
are argued to affect consumption in several ways. There is a collateral effect as illiquid wealth
becomes more "spendable" when credit conditions are eased. Next there is an effect on the
loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios available for first-time buyers (allowing them to save
less). Lastly there might also be changes in the interest rate response (access to credit gives
better chances for inter-temporal smoothing). Hence the consumption function being estimated
has both a direct effect from credit market liberalization and indirect effects through interaction
with several of the variables.
When estimated on UK data, the introduction of the CCI as an extra variable improves the
performance of the model. The CCI has an independently positive impact and by interacting
it with other variables they find that it reduces the "pure" effects of housing wealth, expected
income growth and the change in interest rates. The coefficients of the interaction terms get the
same sign as their main coefficients. Hence, parts of the effects that in a model without a CCI
would have been attributed to the variables alone, are simply due to changes in the underlying
"credit regime".
If the methodology of credit condition indices is to gain increased relevance and usage more
empirical evidence is needed. The main objective of this thesis is therefore to estimate a CCI
for Norway, following the setup and method of Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006).
To do so I go through several steps. Chapter 2 outlines how the regulation of Norwegian credit
markets has developed since the 1970s. I have combined various sources in order to provide a
relatively detailed summary of the deregulation process that took place. As far as I am aware of,
there exists no other unified presentation of this kind, making this chapter important in its own
respect. This also motivates that a more detailed version of Chapter 2 will be made available in
Krogh (2010, forthcoming). In Chapter 3 I consider what tendencies in credit conditions that
can be drawn from the mortgage survey conducted by Finanstilsynet. The purpose of Chapters
2-3 is to provide sound qualitative evidence for the structural development of the Norwegian
credit markets since the 1970s. The requirement for a sensible estimate of the CCI must be that
it is in line with this qualitative information.
Chapter 4 contains the model I will use to estimate the CCI and also sketch what I think
the CCI will look like. I formulate a system of two equations to explain the development in
secured and unsecured debt relative to income. Chapter 5 explains how the model is estimated
using a maximum likelihood approach and it also provides some considerations of practical
problems that may arise when the model is estimated. The end result of this chapter is a
Stata command4 that is tailor-made to estimate the model. The description of the maximum
likelihood framework applied and the derivations that accompany it can be useful for other
researchers that want use their own maximum likelihood codes to estimate a nonlinear SUR
4All estimations have been performed with the statistical software Stata (StataCorp, 2007; Rel. 10).
4
model. This can be relevant if their model entails a variation that is not permitted by the
standard commands that exist.
The estimates are presented in Chapter 6. I detect long-run relationships that have fairly
reasonable coefficients, but with some exceptions. The implied CCI has a shape that matches
most of the ex ante expectations that I have, given the evidence in Chapters 2-3, but both
the CCI and the demographic variable seem to get too large coefficients in the equation for
unsecured debt. I judge my results to represent a very useful first step, but I do think that the
model probably ignores an important interaction between secured and unsecured debt that has
led to a shift from the latter to the former type of debt. I describe how the weaknesses of my
results point in this direction. Chapter 7 concludes.
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2 Institutional background
The main sources for this chapter have been
 The National Budget and the Revised National Budget from the Ministry of Finance:
Finansdepartementet (1969a-2007a)5 and Finansdepartementet (1970b-2008b)
 The Annual Report from the Central Bank of Norway: Norges Bank (1970a-2008a)
 The Annual Report from the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway: Finanstilsynet
(1986a-2008a)
Finansdepartementet (1970b-1978b) contains appendices discussing the credit policy of the
government and has been the most important source for the period 1970-78. In Norges Bank
(1970a-1986a) we find thorough descriptions of the credit policy and this has been used as the
main source for the period 1978-1986. After 1986 these description were omitted from the
annual reports, but the reports still contain letters of announcement sent from Norges Bank
to the financial institutions, and this is an important source of information (both before and
after 1986). The description of the credit policy found in Finansdepartementet (1985a-2007a)
is better than in previous editions of the National Budget (Finansdepartementet, 1969a-1984a)
and is useful for our purposes. Furthermore, Finanstilsynet (1986a-2008a) is an important
source for material on bank losses and market conditions from 1986 and onwards, and also
letters sent from Finanstilsynet to the financial institutions are valuable.6 If a source different
from these has been used, I will state that explicitly.
2.1 Status in the 1970s
The credit and monetary policy of the government had two main goals: A low and stable
level of interest rates, and a careful injection of credit into the economy (see a contemporary
description in Eide (1973)). The available credit was primarily to be used for investments, and
the government wanted to limit households’ borrowing for consumption purposes. The basis for
credit policy during this period was the Credit Law of 1965. This law specified the instruments
available for the authorities and it replaced earlier laws (see Norwegian Official Reports (1980)
for a brief description of the law). The main goal of the new law was to change credit policy
from being settled with explicit agreements between the government and the financial sector
towards more indirect control where the authorities affected the liquidity of the credit market
instead.
5Note that the national budget of year t is published in the autumn the year before.
6Most of these are downloadable at www.finanstilsynet.no. Letters that are not on the web are available
in the archives of Finanstilsynet.
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The main document for the credit policy was the credit budget, of which the government
published a comprehensive version every year. The budget specified the amount of credit the
authorities found it desirable for the financial institutions to supply in the course of the year,
and also how this was to be shared between the different parts of the financial system.7 To
make sure that the budget was met the government had several different regulations. In the
early 1970s these can be described as follows:8
Quantitative regulations: a) Primary reserve requirements: Minimum requirement for the
percentage of total assets that had to be held as primary reserves (i.e. deposits in Norges
Bank, Postal Giro deposits and Post Office Savings Bank deposits (state banks), Trea-
sury notes and notes and coins); b) Placement requirements: Requirement to invest a
given percentage of the increase in total assets in the bond market; c) Additional reserve
requirements: Requirement to put aside extra reserves given as a percentage of further
growth in lending if lending exceeded a given limit; and d) Other direct regulations: The
Credit Law also made it possible for the government to set discrete rules for permitted
lending growth as well (i.e. less flexible for the firms but more direct control for the
government) where a financial penalty was the result if a company exceeded its limit.
Interest rate controls: The most important interest rates on loans from the banks were dic-
tated by the government through interest rate norms.
Foreign exchange controls: Transactions with and access to foreign exchange was exten-
sively regulated (i.e. capital mobility was low). Any sale or purchase of foreign ex-
change had to go through one of the authorized foreign exchange banks. Banks’ access
to lend with foreign banks, as well as their currency holdings, were directly regulated.
If businesses or private persons wanted to take up a loan abroad (or a foreign currency
loan through a domestic bank), a licence from the authorities was needed. The number of
licences was limited and these were in general only given if the purpose of the loan was
investments or activities related to exports. For the oil and shipping sectors a licence was
not needed. The private sector was not allowed to buy foreign securities and foreigners’
access to buy Norwegian securities was very limited as well.9
7The budget was announced together with the National Budget every fall. In addition a revised credit budget
was released together with the Revised National Budget in the spring.
8A part of the credit policy that I will not discuss is the existence of state banks. The government operated a
total of 9 state banks that had been created to provide credit either to regions or to groups/causes that otherwise
would have problems getting affordable credit in the private market like for instance students, fishermen and the
agriculture sector. Most of these are still operated at present date. The most important state bank for ordinary
households was one granting house mortgages (Husbanken), and it was a part of the house-building policy of the
government. State banks were quite important as long as credit was rationed, but their role decreased some in
relevance when the credit market was deregulated. See Norwegian Official Reports (1995) for a thorough report
on the subject of state banks.
9Domestic residents could trade foreign securities on the so-called "switch market". This was not of great
7
Of the quantitative regulations, a) and c) were used to control the supply of credit from banks,
while both banks and life insurance companies were affected by b). Through this the gov-
ernment secured a minimum demand for bonds in the bond market. Since the issuing of new
bonds was regulated (not all firms could issue bonds), the supply of bonds was also controlled
by the authorities. d) was used actively to limit lending from finance companies and non-life
insurance companies.
Besides the regulation that was a part of the active credit policy, is also existed prudential
regulation in the form of:
Capital requirements: Minimum requirement for the size of an institution’s capital (share
capital, reserve funds, retained earnings and subordinated debt) as a percentage of total
liabilities (possibly deducted for the capital itself and some other assets – there were
some changes over time).
Liquidity requirements: Minimum requirement for the size of an institution’s liquid assets
as a percentage of total liabilities. Liquid assets was defined basically in the same way
as primary reserves. The main purpose was to secure that institutions were able to meet
their short-term obligations.
Neither of these requirements were of any importance before the end of the 1980s. The primary
reserve requirements normally secured that the liquidity requirements were met as well, and the
capital requirement was seldom binding. The capital requirement is discussed more in Section
2.4.2.
A very short description of how policy was conducted in the period of 1970-1988 would be
that the authorities continuously adjusted their instruments (the reserve requirements and other
direct regulations) in an attempt to keep the growth of credit under control. This was relatively
successful in the beginning of the 70s, but later the effectiveness declined steadily.
Primary reserve requirements were frequently adjusted in order to withdraw or provide
liquidity for the banks. To illustrate how often they were changed, the primary reserve require-
ment for commercial banks is given in Figure 2.1.10 An increased primary reserve requirement
had the effect of reducing the "lendable" amount of capital, given the level of reserves, making
it more expensive to extend new loans.
While changing the primary reserve requirements was a part of the current operations in the
conduct of credit policy, additional reserve requirements were only used when the situation got
particularly "out of hand". An additional reserve requirement worked almost as a progressive
primary requirement; a very high reserve requirement as soon as a specific limit for the growth
importance and it was closed in the middle of 1984.
10Savings banks were given a separate requirement which was usually a bit lower.
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Figure 2.1: Primary reserve requirement for commercial banks, 1970-1987.a
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Figure 2.2: When additional reserve requirements were in place, 1970-1987.b
aRequirement for banks in "the south" (i.e. banks that did not have their main office in one of the northernmost
counties, Nordland, Troms or Finmark.). The series is based on monthly observations (if requirements were
changed in the middle of a month, it is graphed as constant at the new level through the entire month). In the end
of 1974 and through 1975 there was a lowering of the requirement for small banks. The basis of calculation was
updated in 1978, 1982, 1985 and 1986. The first three times this worked as minor easing of requirements, while it
was a small tightening in 1986.
bThe lines indicate the periods of which a requirement was active (from when it was made public until expira-
tion). The lines should be interpreted as follows: If a line ends in December and another line continues in January
the next year, they represent the same requirement. Those in 1970, 1973 and 1974 were only for commercial
banks. That of 1978, 1981 (until March 1982) and that of 1986-1987 were for both types, while that of 1982 (from
March) was only for savings banks. There was no "standard" requirement: most incidents differed in some ways.
Some requirements were also updated during their duration.
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in lending was exceeded. Figure 2.2 shows when additional reserve requirements were active
until the last was removed in October 1987.
In addition to the reserve requirements that limited lending from the banks, finance com-
panies and non-life insurance companies were in almost every year from 1971 to 1988 (with
a few exceptions) regulated directly. This meant that the companies were given a percentage
limit for howmuch their lending could increase. The authorities could also adjust the placement
requirement as a policy instrument but this was not used very actively.
Figure 2.3 illustrates how the operative difficulties of "credit planning" became larger over
time. This figure gives the percentage deviation between the credit supplied during a year
relative to what the politicians had put up as bounds in the credit budget. It indicates how
the authorities’ grip with the credit market became looser throughout the period, both due to a
process of financial innovation (institutions were doing their best to sidestep the rules), change
in efforts made to keep the flow of credit within the bounds of the budget (was the government
actually expecting the credit budget to be met in the mid 1980s?) and the gradual deregulation
that took place.
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Figure 2.3: Percentage deviation between the actual credit supplied and the bounds of the credit
budget, 1966-1987 (source: Norwegian Official Reports (1989)).
There are two sharp drops in Figure 2.3: one in 1975 and one in 1978. In 1975 it was
a downturn in the Norwegian economy, and a part of the counter-cyclical measures was an
expansionary credit policy. Banks were encouraged to provide credit for export companies
such that they could increase their inventories as the downturn was partly driven by a contracted
world economy. Various regulations were temporarily eased and the permitted level of lending
from the state banks and the size of the credit budget were both increased. However, as seen in
Figure 2.3, lending grew only slightly and the total credit supply ended far below the limits of
the budget.
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The dip in 1978 coincided with a contractionary credit policy.11 Lending ceilings for both
state banks and private banks were reduced. In addition the government made the private banks
agree to limit the amount that households borrowed for consumption purposes.12 During the
same period there were also changes in the interest rate and foreign exchange controls: see
Section 2.3. Of these, the change in the interest rate controls probably had the most rapid effect
and it lead to an increase in the interest rate level. In September 1978 a price and wage freeze
was introduced, a sign of how drastic the situation was this year. The freeze lasted until the end
of 1979.13
2.2 The grey market
Without doubt the authorities understood that the more regulated the ordinary credit market
was, the stronger were the incentives for agents to enter the unregulated credit market (the
"grey market").
Since the credit regulations were concerned with regulating financial institutions, it existed
an opening for an unregulated market with direct lending between lenders and borrowers, usu-
ally using a finance broker as an intermediary. Even though we do not have complete statistics
for the size of the grey market, we know that it started to grow during the late 1970s, and
became considerable in the early 1980s. The existence of a relatively well-functioning grey
market clearly reduced the effect of the credit regulations. If the government attempted to re-
duce the growth in lending from banks, borrowers and lenders could meet in the unregulated
market instead. Financial institutions could also enter this market with loans outside their bal-
ance sheets. The banks’ involvement in this market was also to put up guarantees for the loans,
making a loan in the grey market less risky.
There exists data on the volume of the guarantees issued by the financial institutions, and
also loans brokered by finance brokers without guarantees (but on this it is incomplete cover-
age). Based on these data the grey market had a very modest size in the mid 70s, but it grew
rapidly starting in 1979 (see Norwegian Official Reports (1983, Table 10A)). By the end of
1981 the guarantees plus loans brokered was at about 11 billion kroner, by 1983 20 billion and
by the 3rd quarter of 1987 it peaked (in nominal terms) at 34 billion kroner. At this point in time
11This policy was intended to reduce private consumption growth and lower wage and price inflation in order
to improve the competitiveness of the export industries.
12The deal was to reduce this kind of loans by 2,000 mill. kroner during 1978. It was made effective by the fact
that Norges Bank required the agreement to be followed if a bank was to get access to the automatic lending from
the central bank. A similar deal was agreed upon in 1979 as well.
13A further tightening of the credit policy came in 1979 when A- and B-loans were introduced as the new system
of central bank loans to the banks. A-loans were quite ordinary central bank loans, but B-loans were loans that
came with very strict conditions almost mimicking additional reserve requirements. If a bank’s quota for A-loans
was spent, B-loans was the only alternative. This system gave another instrument to limit the growth in lending.
However, it was not as effective as one hoped for and the system with B-loans was suspended from July 1983.
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that amounted to roughly 5% the size of the total assets of commercial and savings banks (see
tables found in Norges Bank (1983b-1989b)). The real size of the market was probably even
larger. We should therefore keep the grey market in mind when evaluating the effects of the
credit regulations, especially in the 1980s. Its presence reduced the reliability of the available
statistics and it became, by reducing the effectiveness of the regulations in place, an important
motivation for the deregulation process.
2.3 The deregulation process
Let us now go through how the credit market was deregulated, considering each part of the
credit market separately.
2.3.1 Removal of interest rate controls
The interest rate norms were withdrawn as early as in December 1977 (except for some types
of mortgage loans). This entailed that banks were permitted to freely charge any interest rate.
The authorities wanted to generate a general increase in the interest rate level, such that the real
interest rate would turn positive,14 curbing total demand for credit. Furthermore, the control
of the interest rates on the bond market was relaxed considerably (but not the control of whom
that could issue).
However, when the prize freeze was introduced in 1978 this also covered interest rates, such
that these were under government control again. In December 1979 the freeze ended, but the
control of the interest rates was kept despite previous intentions of allowing it to float freely.
The interest rate policy was re-formalized into the system of interest rate declarations the fall
of 1980, a system where the Minister of Finance occasionally issued declarations with a ceiling
for what it would accept for various interest rates. This was similar to the interest rate norms
but less strict.
The interest rate declarations were abandoned from September 1985 and after this the in-
terest rates floated freely.
2.3.2 Liberalization of the bond market
The liberalization of the bond market followed a pattern similar to that of the interest rate. First
liberalization, then a period of re-regulation, and then gradual liberalization again. From the
1st of October 1980, the regulation of bond issuing was liberalized, in principle a complete lib-
eralization of the supply side of bonds and private businesses as well as loan associations were
14The real interest rate had been negative most of the 70s. As one saw that net debt increased with income, this
also had an undesirable distributional effect.
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free to issue as many bonds as they liked. The demand for bonds continued to be stimulated by
the placement requirement, which was kept unchanged.
The effect of the deregulation was, not surprisingly, a large increase in the flow of credit
in the bond market, and it was stronger than what the government had envisaged. Therefore,
in October 1981, the government saw it necessary to reintroduce some regulations in the bond
market. Loan associations, who had been responsible of about half of the bonds issued from the
private sector and municipalities the last 12 months, were denied to issue any new bonds the rest
of the year. However, businesses could continue to issue bonds, making the market still more
liberal than pre-1980. New regulations for the bond market were presented in March 1982, but
these were far from as strict as those that existed prior to 1980, even though loan associations
were kept under direct regulation. Hence, even though the liberalization from 1980 had been
partly reversed, it is fair to say that deregulation of the bond market was well under way. The
process would continue with a gradual decrease in placement requirements (both to liberalize
the demand side and also because the requirement became redundant), and an easing of the
supply side regulation. For instance, in 1983 the regulation of loan associations was relaxed
further when the bounds for selling bonds to the non-financial private sector were removed.
Several important changes were introduced in 1985. Up until then, new bonds had a been
required to have a minimum maturity of 12 months, but now certificates (bonds with a maturity
up to 12 months) were allowed to be traded. Also, the placement requirement for banks was
revoked from the 1. January 1985, and it was set to zero for life insurance companies and
pension funds at the same time (and subsequently revoked in July 1985).
The very last regulations, which were bounds for the loan associations’ lending for housing-
purposes, primary industries and power plants, were removed from the 1st of July 1988.
2.3.3 Removal of exchange controls
The first step towards full removal of exchange controls was taken already in 1978. Before this
banks had been given quantitative limits for their lending with institutions abroad. Now it was
changed to a requirement that all authorized foreign exchange banks had to have an approxi-
mately zero total position (net spot and forward claims) at the end of every day. Hence lending
abroad was unlimited for banks as long as their total position was close to zero. Initially this
was only a trial system, but it was made permanent a few years later. This change had far-
reaching consequences and has been claimed by some to have been one of the most important
steps in the deregulation process (see Grønvik (1994, p. 207)). Banks could from now on bor-
row more extensively abroad and this weakened the traditional link between domestic deposits
and domestic loans, reducing the authorities’ ability to control the credit supply.
The liberalization of the exchange controls took a new step in June 1984. Domestic resi-
dents were from now on allowed to invest as much as they wanted in foreign stock markets, but
13
investments in non-listed stocks and in bonds were still regulated. Of other changes the licence
requirement for direct investments in Norway was removed. But to reduce the supply of credit
from abroad, foreigners’ access to invest in bonds was withdrawn in November (earlier they
could invest up to 1 mill. kroner).
In February 1985 domestic residents and companies were permitted to invest in foreign
bonds denominated in foreign currency (but only up to a limit; 1 mill. kroner for private
residents and up to 5 mill. for companies). Furthermore, in the autumn the same year the
authorities removed the requirement of a license from domestic residents who took up a loan
abroad (through the foreign exchange banks).
The liberalization of capital flows continued in 1989. In May foreigners were again allowed
to purchase listed bonds in Norway and this time without any limits. In July the authorities gave
domestic residents permission to buy shares in foreign securities funds. Finally, in December
foreigners were allowed to issue bonds on the Norwegian bond market.
In 1990 a new set of foreign exchange regulations was presented, and this marked the end of
the remaining foreign exchange control, even though the practical implications of this change
were modest. Previously all transactions that were not permitted were forbidden. From now on
the premise would be the opposite: all transactions were permitted unless they were forbidden.
2.3.4 Removal of quantitative regulations
Among the instruments for the credit policy listed in Section 2.1, the quantitative regulations
were the last to be removed. The first easing of quantitative regulations was not the removal
of one of the instruments in the list above but a step that was taken to make the banks more
active in the mortgage market and thus reduce the importance of state banks. The banks agreed
with the government to offer 6,000 mortgages with better conditions than normal mortgages,
so-called PSV-loans.15 As a compensation the banks’ lending bounds were increased by the
same amount as all the PSV-loans in total.16
The next change was the introduction of new quantitative regulations, not removal of old.
As already discussed in Section 2.2, an unregulated credit market based on direct loans between
individuals had developed. Up until now, no regulations were designed to control the amount of
credit in this market. In January 1983 this changed. From now on the guarantees that financial
institutions issued for loans in the grey market were directly regulated. The guarantees could
at the end of the year not have increased in real terms compared to the level in the 3rd quarter
of 1982. With this the regulators were hoping to avoid that a tightening of ordinary credit only
lead to a leak over to the grey market. This regulation was temporarily removed in the second
half of 1984, but re-introduced in January 1986 limiting guarantees to the stay below the level
15PSV is an acronym for the Norwegian sentence ‘På Spesielle Vilkår’ which means ‘On Special Terms’.
16This arrangement would continue for several years.
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they ended at in 1985.
If we look at Figures 2.1-2.2 again, we see that both primary reserve requirements and
additional reserve requirements were used frequently up until the mid 1980s. But from the
beginning of 1984, the additional reserve requirements were removed, and this was actually
intended to be a permanent removal. It was followed by a period of increased primary reserve
requirements in one last attempt to only use indirect instruments to control the flow of credit.
The job was not easy – it was a period of very strong growth in credit. The introduction of
the regulation of guarantees issued for loans in the grey market (see description above) caused
further difficulties. Since loans that were previously in the unregulated market were moved
to the banks’ balance sheets, it was hard for regulators to measure the real growth of credit.
To dampen the growth, and despite previous intentions, additional reserve requirements were
revived and given to both commercial and savings banks from early in 1986, and these were
tightened again in the summer of 1986.
Apparently, the tightening of requirements did not have that much of an effect – see Figure
2.3. Since the requirements were not effective any longer, all primary reserve requirements
were revoked in June 1987.17 The additional reserve requirements were removed the 9th of
October 1987, marking the complete removal of quantitative regulation of banks. 1987 was also
the last year the government "bothered" to put up a credit budget. The budget was abandoned
from 1988, and one could argue that the budget had been mostly symbolic the last few years.18
When the year 1987 ended, there were very few regulations left. The guarantees issued by
financial institutions for loans in the grey market were still regulated. That was also still the case
for the lending from private finance companies and non-life insurance companies. However,
these last regulations were not given much more time and both were removed from the 1st of
July 1988. It can be argued that this marks the completion of the deregulation.
2.4 The development after deregulation
In the preceding description we have seen that Norway went through an extensive financial
deregulation. As one tangible result of this, there was a boom in lending until the end of the
mid 1980s, but reality caught up with Norwegian financial markets at the beginning of the 90s.
We were about to witness a banking crisis, partly unleashed by the beginning of a decline in
economic activity both in Norway and abroad, but also pushed forward by deeper, structural
problems in an over-sized credit sector.
17Finance companies, who had been given a primary reserve requirement for their factoring loans in 1984, had
to wait until October 1987.
18Instead of a credit budget the authorities started to announce a target zone for the desired level of credit growth.
Every year a relatively wide zone for the planned growth in credit supplied to the private sector and municipalities
would be spelled out, and the (now limited) credit policy instruments would be adjusted in an attempt to keep the
growth within the bands.
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2.4.1 The banking crisis
From around 1987/88 to 1992/93, Norway suffered a major banking crisis. Reinhart and Rogoff
(2008) labels it as one of the world’s "big five" banking crises in the post-war period. It forced
many banks to close down and the government had to take over some of the largest banks
in the country. This section will only give a brief sketch of the events. For more thorough
presentations of the Norwegian banking crisis, see e.g. Norwegian Official Reports (1992) or
Moe, Solheim, and Vale (eds.) (2004).
The first sign of weaknesses in the banking sector came in 1987 when the commercial banks
(as seen in total) suffered net losses for the first time in many years. This was caused by both an
increase in losses on loans but also a minor stock market collapse in October. The Oslo Stock
Exchange index dropped by more than 40 %, pushing the index back to its levels of 1984/85.
Gross losses for both commercial and savings banks had jumped from around 2,000 mill kroner
in 1986 to just below 4,500 mill kroner in 1987. The tendency of increasing losses for the
banks continued in 1988. 5 banks saw their entire capital base being wiped out that year and
total losses for commercial and savings banks increased to 8,700 mill. kroner. The commercial
banks were still facing a net loss and savings banks’ profits were close to negative. The losses
of finance companies were also increasing rapidly. The Commercial Banks’ Guarantee Fund
had to, for the first time in many years, guarantee for all the liabilities of a bank, the regional
bank Sunnmørsbanken.
In 1989 the total losses for the banks amounted to 10,400 mill. kroner. It was especially the
losses of savings banks that pushed the total up to its new level. However, the net results were
actually better than in 1988 and they turned positive for both types of banks as gains from the
stock market gave a boost to revenues, but there were large differences within the sector. The
commercial bank Norion Bank became, at the 30th of October 1989, the first bank since 1923
to be put under administration. It was later decided to liquidate the bank. Several other banks
also struggled. Many failed and their remaining parts were in most cases merged with larger
banks. Finance companies had suffered big losses over the last years, but total losses in 1989
were smaller than in 1988 (1,400 vs. 2,000 mill. kroner). Loan associations were still in an
acceptable situation, but their losses had also started rising.
The banking problems escalated in 1990 when the results of banks were the worst since
WWII. This is also the year it is widely reckoned that the banking crisis erupted. Both com-
mercial and savings banks had net losses, and their total gross losses ended at more than 12
billion kroner. For commercial banks this amounted to a net profit of -0.77 % of the average
total assets. The sum of non-accrual loans was almost as large as the total losses and this
gave warning about difficult times ahead. Several banks had grave problems and were either
guaranteed by the Commercial Banks’ Guarantee Fund or the Savings Banks’ Guarantee Fund
and many near-failing banks were merged with others. Finance companies continued to lose
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money, but lost less than the year before. Loan associations also began to see larger losses,
but continued to have a positive net result. The stock market peaked at a new record-high level
in the beginning of August, only to drop again by almost a third by the end of the year. This
made the financial situation for banks even worse. There was also evidence indicating that the
amount of loans over the grey market had been reduced drastically.
Losses peaked in 1991. Banks faced total losses of almost 20 billion kroner. The Gov-
ernment Bank Guarantee Fund was established to provide loans to the two bank sectors’ own
Guarantee Funds such that they were able to prop up enough guarantees for all the banks that
were in trouble. Later the fund was also allowed to invest directly in problem banks. To provide
capital to relatively sound banks as well, The Government Bank Investment Fund was created
to invest directly in banks on commercial terms. By 1992 it was clear that even though the
losses had peaked in 1991, there were still problems remaining. The banking sector lost a total
of roughly 12 billion kroner (i.e. still very large, but far less than in 1991) and the savings banks
actually made a net profit during the year. The banks that had been supported by the govern-
ment in the crisis had been given clear requirements with respect to cutting administrative costs
and reaching a positive net result as soon as possible. 1992/93 can be regarded as the last years
of the banking crisis. In 1993 the banks’ net results had improved a lot since 1992, both due to
lower losses and gains from increasing asset values. Economic activity had started to pick up
in Norway, and was expected to do so internationally as well.
2.4.2 Changes in the capital requirement
After the quantitative regulations had been removed, the regulation that was left consisted
mainly of the capital and the liquidity requirements (these are described in Section 2.1). Prior
to the end of 1980s these requirements were not that important, as already noted. Primary
reserve requirements normally made sure that liquidity requirements were met while capital
requirements were not binding. Berg and Eitrheim (2009) argue that the regulators did not see
it as necessary to enforce strict capital requirements in the 1970s and 80s. As a consequence,
the capital requirement was relaxed on several occasions and in 1984 and 1987 changes were
made to permit a larger share of a banks capital to consist of subordinated debt, which was in
many cases raised internationally (again, see Berg and Eitrheim (2009)). However, from 1988
and onwards, the capital requirement was to become the main regulatory instrument.19
The first change came in 1988 when it was decided to let the savings banks face the same
requirement as the commercial banks had already faced for a long time.20 A more substantial
19The liquidity requirement was less important. It was also subject to some minor changes in 1988 and also
during the 1990s, but in 2006 the formal liquidity requirement was replaced by a requirement for every institution
to always have enough liquid assets to cover their liabilities when due.
20The requirement was to keep the capital ratio at a minimum of 6.5 % of total liabilities (minus the capital
itself and some near risk-free assets).
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change occured in 1991 when the Basel Accord was implemented, a set of regulations worked
out by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). This was a major step towards international
coordination of bank regulation, but some variation of requirements across countries was per-
mitted. The most important change relative to the old rules was the system of putting weights
on different assets according to their presumed riskiness, in addition to a requirement of con-
solidation within groups of financial companies. Mortgages were given a favorable risk-weight
of 50 % provided that the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio was less than 80 %. A bank’s own capital
would now have to be at least 8 % of this risk-weighted basis of calculation. The rules were in
some ways stricter than the old, for instance due to a consolidation requirement, but the risk-
weighted capital requirement itself was slacker than the old (again, confer Berg and Eitrheim
(2009)). The new rules were to be implemented gradually over the course of a few years.
As a supplement to the capital requirements the Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) was
introduced in 1996.21 While the capital requirements that already existed were motivated by
the desire to limit credit risk, CAD was meant to limit market risk. Financial instruments were
given risk weights and then the weighted sum would form the basis of calculation for the extra
capital requirement introduced (8 % of the basis). This requirement came in addition to the
already existing capital requirement and capital used to cover the latter could not be used to
cover the new one as well. The directive had a very modest effect. An update of the directive,
CAD-II, came in 2000.
During the 1990s, the authorities judged that even though the capital requirements were
fulfilled, core capital’s share of the own capital was uncomfortably low, and they were also
worried about the increasing share of mortgages extended with a very high LTV ratio.22 In
1998 two measures were taken to stop this. First, a house mortgage would only be given the
50 % risk weight if the LTV ratio was less than 60 %. Secondly, banks would only be allowed
to take up new subordinated debt with fixed maturity if their core capital was at least 7 % of
the basis of calculation for the capital requirement (this had already been informally practiced
by Finanstilsynet). These two measures, together with a clear message to the banks about the
need to tighten credit, dampened the credit growth in 1998. In 2001 the LTV limit was set back
to 80 % (as it had been prior to 1998).
A final regulatory change came in 2007 with new capital requirements based on the Basel
II Accord. This accord was much more complex and detailed than its predecessor. For all
the details I refer to Basel Commitee on Banking Supervision (2004). The Accord can be
divided into three subcategories, or pillars. The first pillar is concerned with the minimum
capital requirements. This was the equivalent to the old Basel Accord, but with some new and
21This directive was implemented in the whole European Economic Area.
22The core capital is mainly the share capital, reserve funds, retained earnings and primary capital. That this
ratio was low meant that a large part of the banks’ capital consisted of subordinated debt, a less stable way of
funding.
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important features. Among these was the possibility for institutions to use their own risk models
to calculate their capital requirement (so-called Internal Ratings Based). For those without their
own model it was still a standard system with risk-weights assigned to different assets, much
like the old system, but for mortgages with an LTV below 80 % the risk-weight was reduced
from 50 % to 35 %. Furthermore, house mortgages with a greater LTV and other commercial
loans (up to some maximum limit) were given a risk-weight of 75 %. The second pillar covered
the rules regarding the supervisory review process. Lastly, the third pillar contains regulations
to ensure market discipline through disclosure requirements. It is not realistic to give a good
description of the Accord in this document, but for our purpose it’s important to at least note
that one important effect of the new rules was a reduced capital requirement for most financial
institutions (Finanstilsynet, 2007b), mostly due to the changes within the first pillar.
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3 The mortgage survey of Finanstilsynet
Finanstilsynet, the Norwegian Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA), has since 1999 con-
ducted a yearly survey where the largest Norwegian banks report details regarding the first 100
home mortgages they extend after some date that year.23 These details include the purpose of
the mortgage, the loan-to-value ratio, time to maturity and whether the mortgage has a fixed or
floating interest rate. The data for each survey is summarized in an annual report (Finanstil-
synet, 1999b-2009b). In this chapter I will comment on the most important tendencies in the
surveys.
3.1 Main tendencies
As this survey is conducted by the Norwegian FSA, the focus lies on monitoring the market
for mortgages and look for instabilities that can lead to problems. The main development for
the loan-to-value (LTV) ratios is given in Figure 3.1. There are no drastic shifts in the figure,
but we see that there seems to have been a small tightening of LTV limits from 1997-2001,
and after this a gradual easing up until 2006/07. In 2009 we observe a new and quite sharp
tightening.24 Note that these LTV ratios are based on not just mortgages that are to be used for
purchasing a home but also mortgages used for refinancing or other purposes (using a house as
collateral). One would probably expect the LTV limits for loans that are only for purchasing
houses to be more skewed to the right. Starting from the surveys of 2007 and onwards, this is
actually shown separately (with numbers starting in 2003) and we see that this is correct, but
the movements over time are pretty similar to those of the "gross" LTV ratios.
Around 1998, Finanstilsynet started to worry that Norway was entering a new period of
excessive credit growth and over-indebtedness. As noted in Chapter 2, one response from the
authorities was to increase the risk-weight for loans with an LTV ratio between 60 and 80
percent to 100 % (instead of 50 %). This might have caused some of the shift we see in Figure
3.1. From 1997 to 1999, the survey shows that the share of loans with an LTV of 80 % or more
decreased from 34.3 to 25.3 %. The share with 60-80 % stayed constant, making the category
with less than 60 % increase by 9 percentage points to 39.1 %. In addition, the share of loans
(based on the number, not value) that did not have to posit any form of extra security for their
loan decreased from about 53 % to 43 % for loans from commercial banks with an LTV above
100% in 1998-2000. However, this share increased for savings bank loans in the same period
(from 63 % to 70 %). By 2001, these shares shifted back to around their 1998-levels, at the
23The exact date and time of the year the survey has been conducted has varied throughout the sample. The
survey has actually been conducted since 1994, but the structure of the survey was quite different prior to 1999
(and there are no public reports of the surveys before this).
24The numbers of 2008 do not reflect such a tightening as the survey conducted just around the dramatic events
in the fall of 2008.
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Figure 3.1: The development of loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. The share of loans with various
LTV ratios (shares are based on the value of the loans). Source: Finanstilsynet (1999b-2009b).
same time as the LTV ratios started to shift upwards again.
Average time to maturity has shown an increasing trend from 1999 to 2008. From 1999-
2003 it increased from 14.7 (14.3) to 17.6 (17) years for the mortgages from commercial (sav-
ings) banks. The average time grew for all levels of LTV ratios, and for the loans with an
LTV above 100% it increased from 18.6 (16) to 21.8 (20.6) years, reducing the yearly costs of
borrowing more than 100 % a fair amount. This general upward shift continued, and by 2006
the average time for loans with an LTV above 100% was around 23 years (on average for both
types of banks), and in 2008 it was at 24 years. In 2009, the average time shifted a little bit
back, but it was still above the 2006-level.
Starting with the survey from 2007, Finanstilsynet also reports the average loan-to-income
(LTI) ratios, both on average and over the various LTV ratio groups. These numbers indicate a
slightly increasing trend in average LTI ratios since 2006.
Home equity credit lines are a class of loans that were not covered by the mortgage survey
before 2007. This is a relatively new innovation that has grown rapidly in usage and popularity
since the mid 2000s. Data showing the extent of such credit lines are available from 2006, and
they show that most of the growth in house mortgages has come from increase in credit lines.25
Most of the credit lines have ceilings implying an LTV below 80 %. Finanstilsynet conducted
a survey towards households that had taken up this type of loans, and the majority responded
that the credit was to be used for redecoration/renovation of their home or for a new car or a
cabin. This suggests that mortgage debt starts acting as a substitute for other kinds of debt.
25This can also have contributed to the decrease in LTV ratios seen in Figure 3.1.
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4 Model used to extract a CCI
This chapter explains the basic set-up for the model I will use to extract the credit conditions
index. I follow the ideas of Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) quite closely, but
my exposition is in some respects more detailed. The CCI will be modeled as a common,
unobservable variable in a system of equations for different credit indicators. We start this
chapter by looking at the variables we will use as indicators.
4.1 Indicators for the credit conditions
We need variables that can serve as indicators for the credit conditions such that we rightfully
can assume that the CCI has a significant impact on them. I do not have anything like the
regional information and micro data in Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006), but I have
the same two aggregate variables: households’ stock of secured and unsecured debt. My series
are a bit crude and have been constructed on the basis of total loans to households and housing
loans to households, see Appendix A for the details. Both variables are available for the period
1975Q4 - 2009Q1. As we saw in Chapter 1, the results from Blake and Muellbauer (2009)
indicate that it might be possible to estimate a meaningful CCI with only two equations.
The series for secured and unsecured debt are illustrated in Figure 4.1. Both variables have
a small peak around 1980, and then grow rapidly until around 1990 and the onset of the banking
crisis. Starting in the middle of the 1990s, secured debt enjoys a very strong growth rate, while
the level of unsecured debt stagnates somewhat from 2005.
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Figure 4.1: Real secured and unsecured debt, 1975Q4-2009Q1. Log scale.
4.1.1 Expected effects of the CCI
The main premise for the model I will formulate is that changes in the credit conditions have
an important effect on the level of secured and unsecured debt. Based on the information in
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Chapters 2-3, when are we expecting the credit conditions to matter?
In the late 1970s, the most dominant policy change was the contractionary credit policy of
1978-79, making me believe that credit conditions should have tightened and thus reduced the
level of credit available ceteris paribus. It is not obvious how strong effect we should expect
from the reduction in exchange controls in 1978, but it runs counter to the negative impact from
the contractionary policy and could have partly neutralized it.
If there is a negative shift in the late 70s, some of it might still linger on in the early 1980s,
but by the time of 1983/84 I expect a sharp positive shift in the credit conditions, contributing
to the strong growth in credit up until the end of the 80s. It is in this period the bulk of
deregulation took place and most regulations were removed by 1987. During the banking crisis
I do not believe there are any institutional changes that are able to affect the picture significantly.
The crisis will most likely lead to a tightening in the credit conditions, as banks become more
careful both during the crisis and also in the aftermath. Hence, from around 1988/89, credit
conditions should tighten.
After the crisis, say, from around 1995, I expect to see no significant tightening of credit
conditions, maybe except for a shift in 1998 (due to the temporary increase in risk weight for
loans with an LTV between 60 and 80 %) and in late 2008/early 2009 (due to the financial
crisis). As documented by Finanstilsynet (1999b-2009b), it seems to have been a trend towards
easing of credit conditions, manifested in an upward trend in the LTV ratios, increased average
time to maturity and the introduction of home equity credit lines. The introduction of the Basel
I and II accords (in 1991 and 2007) might also have contributed to an upward trend, as well
as the continued reduction in exchange controls and internationalization of capital flows. This
leads me to expect a gradual easing of credit conditions during the last part of our sample (up
to the financial crisis).
There exist some other studies which look at the process of financial deregulation. Kamin-
sky and Schmukler (2003) contains a wide survey of how financial liberalization has taken
place in 28 different countries, including Norway. The authors distinguish between the liber-
alization of the capital account, the domestic financial system and stock markets. Periods are
labeled as either repressed, partially liberalized or fully liberalized regimes. In their composite
index (taking all three measures into account) the Norwegian financial market was partially
liberalized from September 1985, and fully liberalized from January 1988. This fits well with
the information presented here.
4.1.2 Other explanatory variables
What other variables can be expected to affect secured and unsecured debt? Fernandez-Corugedo
and Muellbauer (2006) contains a careful discussion of this and some of their suggestions are:
 A demographic variable measuring the proportion of potential first-time buyers
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 Income
 Change in the unemployment rate
 Wealth, divided into liquid financial, illiquid financial and housing wealth
 Nominal interest rate
 Real interest rate
 Expected income and expected interest rates
I choose to follow the main arguments of Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) with
respect to which variables to include but with some modifications.
First, and similar to the procedure of Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006), I "de-
flate" both the debt variables and all the wealth variables by the level of income. This is done
to extract trends in the variables that are due to growth in the economy. Hence, I will end
up formulating a model explaining the movements in secured and unsecured debt relative to
income. When a variable X has been deflated by income I denote that variable by Xˆ . The
effect of deflating the debt variables is illustrated in Figure 4.2. For secured debt we see clear
effects through the entire sample, while the effects for unsecured debt are visible after 1990.
We denote secured and unsecured debt as SD and USD, respectively, making the notation for
the deflated series ˆSD and ˆUSD.
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Figure 4.2: Debt variables deflated by income, 1975Q4-2009Q1. Log scale.
As a demographic variable I will use the proportion of individuals in the age group 20-39,
relative to all persons aged 20-74 (call this variable FTB). To control for shifts in income I
include income "per capita" (INCCAP). In the income variable I have subtracted dividends.
These are left out as it only adds noise to our system due to a tax-change that caused a surge in
dividends paid out in the years prior to 2006, followed by dramatic drop. To obtain per capita
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numbers I divide by the number of persons of the age of 20-74. I use the same income variable
(without dividing by the population) to deflate debt and wealth variables.
Wealth is included as liquid wealth (LIQ, defined as notes, coins and deposits), moderately
liquid wealth (MLIQ, defined as bonds, stocks, loans and other claims) and housing wealth
(HW ).26 The real interest rate net of taxes is also included (r). The change in the nominal
interest rate (Di) is added to capture the cash-flow effect for households from changes in the
nominal interest rate level. Changes in the unemployment rate (Du) are included to capture un-
certainty. Expected growth in interest rates (iexp) is included as the difference between the rate
on Norwegian 10-year government bonds and the money market rate. Finally, I have a variable
capturing expected income growth (incexp). This is an estimate of the log deviation between
the permanent income and current income of households. It is based on an assumption that
households estimate their future income using a simple OLS model. Appendix A documents
all the data series.
The discussion in Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) also includes arguments
about how they expect all these variables to affect secured and unsecured debt. Some but not
all of the arguments below coincides with theirs.
I expect FTB to have a positive effect on both variables. The age-group 20-39 is, broadly
speaking, the group of first-time buyers. When it increases, there is a greater need for mort-
gages. A negative impact might arise from the fact that first-time buyers probably take up
smaller mortgages than agents closer to their prime age, but as our age group is so broad this
should not be a large effect. Furthermore, this age group might use unsecured debt to smooth
income in anticipation of higher wages in the future. The partial effect of higher income per
capita is expected to be positive for secured debt because higher income allows you to buy a
greater house (given some degree of credit constraints to begin with). On the other hand, one
would expect income per capita to have a negative impact on unsecured debt since that reduces
the need for taking up expensive loans. At the same time, higher income permits you to service
a larger amount of debt, and if you really are credit constrained, you might choose to increase
your stock of expensive debt if this is your only alternative. Hence the income effect on un-
secured debt is ambiguous. The change in the unemployment rate is included as a proxy for
income uncertainty and is expected to have a negative impact on secured debt to income. It
should also affect unsecured debt negatively but the net effect is ambiguous since unemployed
might use unsecured debt to smooth their income. Parts of the effect is already captured by the
income term, but maybe not all of it.
The wealth to income variables are expected to affect the debt to income ratios through
one main mechanism: For secured debt, the wealth variables can be used as collateral. They
26Illiquid wealth (defined as insurance technical reserves) is left out, mainly due to its somewhat diffuse eco-
nomic interpretation.
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can also, to a varying degree, serve as "back-up" for unsecured debt; some households will
feel more comfortable taking up unsecured debt when they know they have assets that can be
sold if necessary. In addition, the wealth variables might affect the need for debt. When house
prices go up, this increases the need for debt, making the positive effect from housing wealth
stronger. More liquid wealth might have a partially negative effect on debt, and especially
unsecured debt, since that reduces the need for taking up expensive loans. But I do not believe
that this effect will dominate the "back-up" effect. Hence I expect in general all the wealth
variables to have a positive effect on both secured and unsecured debt to income.
An increase in the nominal interest rate is assumed to affect secured debt negatively. This
effect kicks in for unsecured debt as well, but here it might also be a positive substitution effect
as it becomes harder to get secured debt when the interest rate is high. This makes the sign
of Di ambiguous for unsecured debt. A higher real interest rate should have a negative effect
for both types of debt. It makes loans more costly and motivates inter-temporal substitution.
There is an off-setting effect from the fact that the return on the wealth of households increase
in value, but this effect should be captured by the wealth terms (if their value increases) and the
income variable (since net interest income is a part of it). Higher expected growth in interest
rates should decrease both types of debt. Higher expected income should have a positive effect
on both types of debt.
4.2 The model
I first formulate a vector auto-regressive (VAR) model that includes all the variables in my
dataset. VARs are, as shown below, very general formulations that in principle treats all the
variables in the system as endogenous. I will guide us through the assumptions that are needed
to reduce this system to one with two semi-reduced form equations for secured and unsecured
debt to income. Even though I only impose restrictions without testing for them, I think it is
useful to begin with the general formulation in any case, such that the assumptions underlying
the model are made as clear as possible. Most tests must be skipped since the CCI itself is
estimated from the data, making it very difficult, if not impossible, to perform a full statistical
analysis. This also makes it necessary to simplify the short-run dynamics of the model to avoid
an extremely large number of parameters.
As shown in Appendix B, several of the variables we will use in the analysis can be inter-
preted as I(1) variables – that is, they are non-stationary variables of degree 1. This forces us to
take into account some considerations that are not relevant in the stationary world. In general,
regressing an I(1) variable on other I(1) variables might lead to a phenomena called spurious
regressions (see Granger and Newbold (1974)). The point is that even if two I(1) variables are
completely uncorrelated, the coefficient estimate from a regression of one of them on the other
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nevertheless converges asymptotically towards a non-zero value. You might end up detecting a
relationship even though there is no such present (hence the term spurious regression). How-
ever, not all regressions that involve non-stationary variables are spurious. This is where the
concept of cointegration enters. A set of I(1) variables are said to be cointegrated if a linear
combination of these is a stationary variable (see e.g. Hamilton (1994, Chapter 19)). If, for
instance, aggregate consumption is always a given proportion of income (times some multi-
plicative noise), then the difference between the log of the two series is always just a constant
plus some noise. Even though both (log of) consumption and income are found to be non-
stationary, the difference between the two will be stationary. Such a linear combination of the
variables is usually referred to as the cointegrated relationship. Furthermore, a set of q variables
can have as many as q 1 cointegrating vectors, such that finding cointegration between more
than 2 variables raises the issue of finding the number of such vectors as well.
There exist well documented methods for testing the number of cointegrating vectors. For
a maximum likelihood method see Hamilton (1994, Chapter 20) which describes the Johansen
method due to Johansen (1988). Within the same framework there also exist tests for which
variables in the relationship that are exogenous with respect to the parameters of the cointegrat-
ing vector. We will see below how these concepts are related to our model.
4.2.1 Defining equations
Let us define three vectors of variables:
yt =
 
sˆdt
ˆusdt
!
; xt =
0BBBBBBBBB@
inccapt
ˆliqt
ˆmliqt
hˆwt
rt
FTBt
1CCCCCCCCCA
; vt =
0BBBB@
Dit
Dut
incexpt
iexpt
1CCCCA
where lowercase letters imply that that it is the natural logarithm of the variable (except for
i, r, u, incexp and iexp which are in rates). inccapt has been deflated with the CPI. Let kx
denote the row dimension of x and kv be that of v. We have observations of yt , xt and vt for
t = 0;1; :::;T , where 0 refers to the fourth quarter of 1975 and T = 133 is the first quarter of
2009. Let the credit conditions index at time t be given as CCIt . For now I will treat CCIt as
any other variable. In Section 4.2.2 we will consider its functional form.
I assume that y, x and CCI follow a VAR process of lag-order p where v enters contem-
poraneously as an exogenous variable. This means that the variables in v are assumed to only
affect the short-run dynamics, and such a simplification makes sense: we assume that the ef-
fects from changes in the unemployment rate, changes in the interest rate, expected income
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growth and expected growth in interest rates are all "neutral" in the long run. The VAR is given
by (ignoring constant terms for now):0B@ ytxt
CCIt
1CA= A00vt + på
i=1
A0i
0B@ yt ixt i
CCIt i
1CA+ et (4.1)
for t = p; p+1; :::;T where A0 is a kv x (3+kx) coefficient matrix and Ai is a 3+kx square matrix
for i= 1; :::; p. The column vector et contains two bi-normally distributed errors. I assume that
the vector of disturbances et is independently and identically normally distributed according
to:
et  N(0;W) (4.2)
W denotes the (3+kx)x(3+kx) variance-covariance matrix. We note that, as was intended, this
formulation permits in principle all the variables in yt , xt and CCIt to be endogenous with
respect to the system.
It is useful to rewrite (4.1) in the following way:
D
0B@ ytxt
CCIt
1CA= A00vt +P0
0B@ yt 1xt 1
CCIt 1
1CA+ p 1å
i=1
P0iD
0B@ yt ixt i
CCIt i
1CA+ et (4.3)
with the new coefficient matrices defined as:
P0 =
p
å
i=1
A0i  I3+kx
P0i = 
p
å
j=i+1
A0j
As shown in Appendix B, the variables of yt as well as inccapt , ˆliqt , ˆmliqt , hˆwt and FTBt
can all be interpreted as I(1) variables. Let us also assume the CCIt can be regarded as I(1).
The remaining variables can be interpreted as I(0). Since I(1) variables become I(0) when
differenced, D

yt 1 xt 1 CCIt 1
0
is a vector of I(0) variables, ignoring the small incon-
sistency of letting r enter as well.27 Hence the only term consisting of I(1) variables in (4.3) is
P0

yt 1 xt 1 CCIt 1
0
. If the model is to be able to explain its left-hand side (LHS) vari-
ables, it is necessary that the equations in the system are balanced (Granger, 1990, p. 12-13),
27r is permitted to be a part of the cointegration space. In principle, adding an I(0) variable (such as r) to a
combination of I(1) variables will not help you achieve cointegration, but as long as r has some non-stationary
"tendencies" in parts of the sample this might be enough to get cointegration. In addition, there will in many
applications be economically relevant to include I(0) variables in levels form since we want to interpret the coin-
tegrating relationships as steady-state theoretical relationships which can include variables of both types.
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meaning that if the LHS is I(0), the right-hand side (RHS) must be I(0) as well. This implies
that the system in (4.3) makes logical sense only if P0

yt 1 xt 1 CCIt 1
0
is a vector of
I(0) variables.
This is where the concept of cointegration enters. We remember that q different I(1) vari-
ables are cointegrated if there exist at least one linear combination of them that is stationary.
Furthermore, these q variables can be involved in at most q 1 different cointegrated relation-
ships. It is clear that the only way P0

yt 1 xt 1 CCIt 1
0
can consist of stationary terms,
besides the zero vector possibility, is if it consists solely of cointegrated relationships. Basically,
this is the essence of Granger’s Representation Theorem (Engle and Granger, 1987). It says
that if there exists cointegration between a set of variables, then a vector error-correction model
(VECM) of the type in (4.3) can be formulated, and vice versa. Hence, given cointegration, the
formulation in (4.3) is valid, and if (4.3) is the true process, then there exist cointegration (as
long as P is not a zero matrix).
Now even if the "presence" of cointegration is settled, we need to find out how many coin-
tegrated relationships there are. This question is closely related to the rank of P. The rank of
P is the number of linearly independent rows (or columns) in P, and it is denoted r(P). This
should tell us that the number of cointegrated relationships in the system (4.3) equals r(P).
The intuition is quite straight forward. If r(P) = 0 then P must be the zero matrix. The
system is balanced since no I(1) variables enter any longer, and there exist no cointegration
since no linear combinations of y, x and CCI affect their respective growth rates. If on the
other hand r(P) = c with 0 < c < 3+ kx, then there are c different cointegrated relation-
ships. This means that c different linearly independent columns of P will, in product with
yt 1 xt 1 CCIt 1
0
result in I(0) variables. The remaining terms ofP0

yt 1 xt 1 CCIt 1
0
will be linear combinations of these products.28
If we were to perform a state of the art Johansen analysis, it would at this stage have been the
time to choose the lag length p such that we got a well-specified model (judged by the properties
of the residuals) and then use some tests in order to determine the rank of P (the number of
cointegrated relationships). But, as already noted, this is not possible to do since CCI is itself
being estimated. Instead I choose p to simplify the short-run dynamics and I choose r(P) to
get a relatively sensible model. My assumption is that the variables in y, x and the CCI form
two cointegrated relationships, which subsequent restrictions will make sure are the long-run
equations for secured and unsecured debt to income. Let us impose the restrictions:
Restriction #1: Set p= 1 in order to simplify the short-run dynamics.
Restriction #2: Set r(P) = 2 to get two cointegrated relationships.
28Clearly, r(P) 6= 3+ kx since q variables can only be linearly combined in q  1 unique ways as long as the
combination must involve at least two variables. r(P) = 3+ kx is only possible if all the variables in y, x and the
CCI are I(0).
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The next step is to use that the matrix P0 can be written as the product ab 0 where a and b
are both 3+ kx x r(P) matrices (see the argument in e.g. Hamilton (1994, Chapter 19)). With
r(P) = 2 we have:
P0 = ab 0 =
0BBBB@
a11 a12
a21 a22
ax1 ax2
ac1 ac2
1CCCCA
 
b11 b12 b1x b1c
b21 b22 b2x b2c
!
where axi and b 0xi are column vectors of order kx for i = 1;2. It is very useful to write P0
as such a matrix product since it illuminates interesting aspects of the structure of P0. b is
usually referred to as the cointegrating vectors, defining the two linear combinations that result
in cointegration. a is often called the loading matrix. It can be interpreted as the matrix with
the coefficients attached to the cointegrated relationships in the various equations. Interpreting
(4.3) as a VECM implies that a contains the error-correction coefficients.
Expressing P0 in this way allows us to be very precise about what restrictions we impose.
First we note that the long-run system is not yet identified. The reason is that even though we
only have two equations left, these contain the exact same variables on the RHS. To secure
identification we need at least one unique variable in each equation and we also need to "set the
scale" in each equation. As exclusion restrictions I assume that the variables in y are excluded
from one equation each. Below we will see that the two equations are interpretable as long-run
equations for secured and unsecured debt. Hence, this restriction implies that the long-run level
of secured (unsecured) debt does not depend on unsecured (secured) debt. This may be a too
strong assumption – see the discussion in Section 6.1.4. Identification is secured as soon as we
choose a normalization in the two columns of b in order to set the scale. This is an innocent
action as long as the true value of the coefficient we normalize with respect to is different from
zero. The restrictions we impose are:
Restriction #3: Set b12 = 0 to exclude usd from the first relationship.
Restriction #4: Set b21 = 0 to exclude sd from the second relationship.
Restriction #5: Set b11 = 1 to set the scale in the first relationship.
Restriction #6: Set b22 = 1 to set the scale in the second relationship.
Even if it had been possible to observe CCI, it would still not be possible to test the validity
of these 4 restrictions. This is the nature of identifying restrictions; you need them in order to
identify the long-run system.
Our next step is to simplify the system further. As we see, the variables in y, x and the
CCI are all still potentially endogenous with respect to the system: they still depend on the
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cointegrated relationships. A variable is exogenous to the system only if we can assume that its
a-coefficients are zero. Imposing exogeneity is something one would have to test for in normal
circumstances, but here I will just assume that the variables in x and the CCI are exogenous to
the system. In addition I will impose the restrictions that each debt variable is exogenous with
respect to the other debt variable. The restrictions are:
Restriction #7: Set axi = 0kx for i= 1;2 to get x as exogenous to the system.
Restriction #8: Set aci = 0 for i= 1;2 to get CCI as exogenous to the system.
Restriction #9: Set a12 = 0 to get usd as exogenous to the first relationship.
Restriction #10: Set a21 = 0 to get sd as exogenous to the second relationship.
where 0kx is the column vector of order kx containing only zeros.
Imposing restrictions #1-10 on the system in (4.3) gives the final equations that we are go-
ing to work with. Based on the exogeneity assumptions it is clear that the two cointegrated
relationships in principle represents long-run equations for the two endogenous variables that
are left (actually they represent these variables’ deviation from long-run equilibrium – see be-
low). These restrictions also legitimate that we only focus on a subset of the complete system,
namely the equations for these two endogenous variables. This can be presented as:
Dyt = A0Rvt aR
 
yt 1 b 0Rxxt 1 b 0RcCCIt 1

+ et (4.4)
where AR is the matrix containing the two leftmost columns of A0 and aR is the matrix of the
two uppermost rows of a . et is the subset of the two uppermost elements of et and it will
be binormally distributed N(0;W) for some 2x2 variance-covariance matrix W.29 We have the
long-run coefficients of x andCCI defined as:
b 0Rx =
 
 bx1=b11
 bx2=b22
!
(4.5)
b 0Rc =
 
 bc1=b11
 bc2=b11
!
(4.6)
As already emphasized, the two elements of (yt 1 b 0Rxxt 1 b 0RcCCIt 1) are the two coin-
tegrated relationships. These can be interpreted as the endogenous variables’ deviation from
long-run equilibrium, making b 0Rxxt 1+bRcCCIt 1 the two long-run equilibria. We see that the
deviations will affect the growth rates of the endogenous variables, making the variables error-
correct as long as the a-terms are positive. This is why such models are called error-correction
29The form of W will naturally depend on W, but that is not of interest to specify further in our setting.
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models. Finally, if we are to estimate the system in (4.4), we need not worry about the prob-
lem of spurious regressions mentioned earlier as long as our assumption of cointegration holds,
since this leaves only I(0) elements left in our model.
4.2.2 Defining the CCI
Until now we have treated the CCI as any other variable, despite that it is a variable it is not
possible to observe. In order to estimate the CCI we need to specify a functional form for it.
Assume that CCI can be represented as a piecewise linear spline function plus a function of
other variables:
CCIt =
T
å
i=1
diqdit +h(crt) (4.7)
for t = 1;2; :::;T where qdit is a dummy for quarter iwhich takes the value 0.25 for t  i and zero
otherwise. The spline-function is completed by assuming di = d j for all pairs (i; j) belonging to
the same year (i.e. the spline function has constant slope within each year). crt represents other
variables that we allow to affect the credit conditions. To be clear, this formulation implies that
the CCI in different periods is defined as:
CCIt0 = 0:25d
0+h(crt0)
CCIt1 = 0:50d
0+h(crt1)
...
CCIt5 = d
0+0:5d 1+h(crt5)
where it is assumed that t0 refers to the first quarter of year 0 and d j is the coefficient of the
dummy variables belonging to year j.
In the function h I want to add other variables that we are assuming only affects the credit
indicators through their impact on CCI. One such variable is the primary reserve requirement
for commercial banks in the south.30 Let the primary reserve requirement in period t be given
as primrest . This will be the quarterly average based on the monthly observations (as presented
in Figure 2.1). I also add a variable that signals whether additional reserve requirements were
active or not. The variable takes the value 1 if additional reserve requirements were active
through the entire quarter, 2=3 if they were active in two thirds of the quarter and 1=3 if they
were active in only one month. Let this variable at time t be given as addreqt (see Figure 2.2
to see when the requirements were active).
30We choose the reserve requirement for the commercial banks instead of that for savings banks because it was
changed more frequently, and can therefore potentially serve as a variable signalling the general policy of the
government as well. In addition, the patterns of commercial and savings banks’ requirements are quite similar, so
it does not matter that much which requirement we choose.
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Define now crt = (primrest ;addreqt)0. I assume that the requirements affect CCI linearly
such that the h-function can be given as:
h(crt) = x 0crt (4.8)
where x is a 2x1 matrix. Gather all the di’s in a column vector of order T (with the within-year
restriction imposed) d and all the quarter shift-dummies in a column vector qdt . Let (d ;x )0= h
and (qdt ;crt)0 = ct such that the final definition of the CCI becomes:
CCIt = h 0ct (4.9)
4.2.3 Normalization
Use the definition ofCCIt from (4.9) to substitute forCCIt in (4.4). Since theCCI is a function
of coefficients that we estimate, it is clear that we cannot estimate both elements of the vector
bRc. However, since the CCI is without scale there are no problems involved in normalizing
the value of this index somehow. I choose units for CCI such that the long-run effect of a
unit increase in CCI results in a unit increase in the long-run value of sd (given the level of
income), i.e. the semi-elasticity is equal to one (since a 1/100th increase in CCI leads to a one
percentage increase in SD). This means that we should interpret an increase in the CCI as an
easing of credit conditions. The identified version of (4.4) then becomes:
Dyt = A0Rvt aR
 
yt 1 b 0Rxxt 1 
 
1
g
!
h 0ct 1
!
+ et (4.10)
where
g = bc2=bc1
g can be interpreted as measuring the impact on usd of a change in CCI that led to a unit
increase in sd (again for a constant level of income).
4.2.4 Estimation
Once the data for yt , xt and ct 1 are available, we are ready to estimate the model. We will
estimate:
Dyt = A0Rvt +B
0
0yt 1+B
0
1xt 1+
 
1
g˜
!
B02ct 1+ et (4.11)
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for t = 1; :::;T where the long-run coefficients in (4.10) are identified through the equations:
B00 = aR (4.12)
B01 = aRb
0
Rx (4.13)
B02 = a11h
0 (4.14)
g˜ =
a22
a11
g (4.15)
Since the errors are correlated and the RHS variables differ between the two equations, this
looks like a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions model (SUR model), as originally developed by
Zellner (1962). Inspecting the model further we realize that the model is nonlinear in some of
the parameters such that what we have is a nonlinear SUR model.
When ordinary SUR models are estimated it is common to apply either Feasible General-
ized Least Squares (FGLS) or Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation. Most statistical soft-
wares provide standard codes for estimating SUR models using FGLS, while an explicit ML
code for SUR models using the statistical software Stata is provided in Gould, Pitblado, and
Sribney (2003). FGLS codes for SUR models are usually, at least in Stata (the command
sureg), based on a two-step procedure as described in Greene (2003, p. 340-47). This proce-
dure has a clear connection to ML since iterating the steps will produce ML estimates. How-
ever, this is not the path taken in "pure" ML models as in Gould, Pitblado, and Sribney (2003).
In these models a more direct formulation is used to attack the problem.
When estimating a nonlinear SUR model, we face basically the same alternatives. We can
either apply Feasible Generalized Nonlinear Least Squares (FGNLS) or direct ML estimation.
In Stata the command nlsur applies FGNLS to estimate such models and it also has an option
that sets it to iterate (making it produce ML estimates). I have not found any examples of pre-
written ML codes for nonlinear SUR models, but it is in principle possible to rewrite the codes
from Gould, Pitblado, and Sribney (2003).
In this thesis I have chosen to apply pure ML estimation. I will derive the entire ML frame-
work necessary in order to estimate (4.11) and then modify the codes from Gould, Pitblado,
and Sribney (2003) (and also write some codes on my own) in order to get a Stata command
tailor-made for our purposes. It must be admitted that the entire ML code was finished before
I realized that the command nlsur existed (it was introduced with the release of Stata version
10 in 2007). Still, developing the ML framework is a useful exercise and I am hoping that
estimating the model in a pure ML framework might make it more flexible for some types of
extensions in the future. There might also be some problems with the nlsur command that I
am not aware of which will strengthen the argument for our own ML code further.31
31As one small "victory" we should also note that nlsur seems to have one, albeit small, problem that the
command I developed does not have. It seems to be sensitive to the choice of normalization (as that made in
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5 Estimation method
This chapter derives the framework that is needed to estimate the model in (4.11) using maxi-
mum likelihood (ML) estimation. This involves finding the likelihood functions we are going
to need and also some of their properties. What we really seek to maximize is the likelihood
function derived in Section 5.1. However, it turns out that we need to make a de-tour which
involves maximizing both a concentrated likelihood function and a gamma-concentrated likeli-
hood function. These functions are derived in Section 5.2 and 5.3. Finally, Section 5.4 explains
how we implement the model in a routine which we can use in Stata to estimate the whole
system.
5.1 Likelihood function
Before we start, let us rewrite the system (4.11) in a more compact fashion. This is useful when
we derive the succeeding results, and it is also in line with the Stata syntax. We define:
F01 =
 
A0R1;B
0
01;B
0
11

F02 =
 
A0R2;B
0
02;B
0
12

zt = (vt ;yt 1;xt 1)0
where AR j is the jth column of the matrix AR and Bi j is the jth column of the matrix Bi (i= 0;1
and j = 1;2). (4.11) is then:
Dyt =
 
F01zt +B
0
2ct 1
F02zt + g˜B
0
2ct 1
!
+ et (5.1)
The basis for estimating the model in (5.1) is to choose estimates for our parameters F1,
F2, B2, g˜ and W such that we maximize the likelihood of observing the given outcome we have
observed.
I have T observations of fDyt ;zt ;ct 1g. The only probabilistic assumption I have made
concerns the distribution of the error terms et . I have assumed that each vector et is identi-
cally, independently distributed according to N(0;W). This implies that the probability density
function (pdf) of et is given as:
fe(et) = (2p) 1jWj 1=2 exp

 1
2
e0tW
 1et

(5.2)
Section 4.2.3) such that changing the normalization does have an effect on the estimates. This is only a problem
when I add the command that asks the code to iterate (to produce ML estimates instead of FGNLS). See Section
5.4.2 for how the problem was solved in the ML code developed here.
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If we now condition Dyt on zt and ct 1, the only random element in Dyt is et . Hence,
conditional on zt and ct 1 the pdf of Dyt E(Dyt) is given as:
fy(Dyt E(Dyt);zt ;ct 1) = (2p) 1jWj 1=2 exp

 1
2
r0tW
 1rt

(5.3)
where
rt =
 
Dy1t F01zt B02ct 1
Dy2t F02zt  g˜B02ct 1
!
(5.4)
Since the errors are uncorrelated and since Pr(Dyt = z) = Pr(Dyt   z = 0), we find the proba-
bility of observing our given outcome fDytgTt=1 as:
gY (fDytgTt=1;fzt ;ct 1gTt=1) =
T
Õ
t=1
1
2p
jWj 1=2 exp

 1
2
r0tW
 1rt

(5.5)
When applying ML this equation is turned around: conditional on what we have observed,
which parameters maximize the likelihood? The likelihood function is thus:
L(F1;F2; g˜;B2;W;fDyt ;zt ;ct 1gTt=0) =
T
Õ
t=t0
1
2p
jWj 1=2 exp

 1
2
r0tW
 1rt

(5.6)
We want to choose our estimates of F1, F2, g˜ , B2 and W such that the function in (5.6) is
maximized. Instead of maximizing L, we can also maximize any monotone transformation of
L. It turns out that it is much easier to maximize the log of the likelihood function which is:
lnL(F1;F2; g˜;B2;W;fDyt ;zt ;ct 1gTt=1) =
T
å
t=1
lnLt(F1;F2; g˜;B2;W) (5.7)
where
lnLt = 12

2ln(2p)+ ln jWj+ r0tW 1rt

(5.8)
For the code we will need to provide formulas for some of the properties of lnL. The
next step is therefore to find the vector of the first-derivatives (the gradient) and the matrix of
the cross and second-derivatives (the Hessian) of the log likelihood function. This is done in
Appendix C. The gradient (g) and the Hessian (H) are given in equations (C.9) and (C.11).
5.2 Concentrated likelihood function
In parts of our routine we will also use a concentrated likelihood function. The reason will
be explained in more detail in Section 5.4, but what we do is to "get rid of" the variance-
covariance matrix W (hence a more concentrated likelihood function) by implementing the
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analytical formula for the ML estimator (MLE) of W.
First, let us write the log-likelihood function in (5.7) as:
lnL= T
2

2ln(2p)+ ln jWj+ tr(W 1W (F1;F2; g˜;B2))

(5.9)
where
W (F1;F2; g˜;B2) =
1
T
T
å
t=1
rtr0t (5.10)
and rt is defined in (5.4). As shown in e.g. Greene (2003, Chapter 14), the MLE of W is:
WˆML =W (Fˆ1;Fˆ2; ˆ˜g;Pˆ2)
where Fˆ1, Fˆ2, ˆ˜g and Pˆ2 are the MLEs of these coefficients. Hence, we can impose this in
our likelihood function by substituting W by W (F1;F2; g˜;B2) in (5.9). With this we get the
concentrated likelihood:
lnLb = 
T
2
[2(ln(2p)+1)+ ln jW (F1;F2; g˜;B2)j] (5.11)
We will need the gradient and the Hessian of the concentrated likelihood function as well.
We will actually only need to find an approximation to the Hessian – see Appendix C for the ar-
gument for this and the derivations. The final results for the gradient (gb ) and the approximated
Hessian (Hb ) are given in equations (C.42) and (C.43).
5.3 Gamma-concentrated likelihood function
In addition to get rid off W we will make the concentrated likelihood function even more con-
centrated by imposing the analytical MLE of g˜ . The reason for this is explained in Section 5.4.
Let us first manipulate the last element of gb into:
gb4 =
1
T jW j
 
s11s32  s21s31  (s11s33  s231)g˜

where si j is the (i; j)th element of the matrix:
S=
0B@ åt r
2
1t : :
åt r1t rˆ2t åt rˆ22t :
åt r1tB02ct 1 åt rˆ2tB
0
2ct 1 åt(B
0
2ct 1)
2
1CA (5.12)
with
rˆ2t =F02zt
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for i; j = 1;2;3. The MLE of g˜ is defined as the value setting gb4 = 0. Hence:
g˜ML =
s11s32  s21s31
s11s33  s231
(5.13)
We can impose (5.13) on our system, changing the concentrated likelihood function to be a
function of only F1, F2 and B2. Let us write (5.13) as:
g˜ML =
A
B
where
A= s11s32  s21s31
B= s11s33  s231
and then we rewrite jW j as follows:
jW j= 1
T 2

å
t
r21tå
t
r22t  (å
t
r1tr2t)2

=
1
T 2
 
s11s22  s221+ g˜2(s11s33  s231) 2g˜(s11s32  s21s31)

It follows that imposing g˜ = A=B gives the "gamma-concentrated" likelihood function:
lnLbg = 
T
2
[2(ln(2p)+1)+ ln jW (F1;F2;B2)j] (5.14)
with
jW j= 1
T 2

s11s22  s221 
A2
B

In Appendix C I derive the gradient (gbg ) and the Hessian (Hbg ) – equations (C.54) and
(C.59) contain the final results.
5.4 Estimation routine
5.4.1 Regarding maximization and SUR-models in general
Estimating a model with ML will normally involve that the maximum is found numerically.
That is: you let the computer choose different values for the coefficients, and based on distinct
properties of the likelihood function the computer can follow an algorithm to search for its
maximum. The properties the computer will utilize are the gradient and the Hessian, and these
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can either be computed numerically or analytically, but the latter requires that you provide the
computer with correct formulas. Hence, the simplest code possible to write is one where you
only code the likelihood function and then let the computer find the gradient and the Hessian
numerically. However, that might cost you both efficiency and precision, especially when
the likelihood function becomes complicated. Therefore it is often wise to calculate these
properties yourself such that these are found analytically instead of numerically.32
To complicate things further, it might even be the case – and it will most likely be the case
for SUR models – that you will struggle with finding a maximum for the likelihood function
(the function does not converge at a point where it is concave), even when you provide a code
for both the gradient and the Hessian. To avoid this problem the recommendation from Gould,
Pitblado, and Sribney (2003) is to maximize the concentrated likelihood function rather than
the likelihood function itself. As explained in Section 5.2, the concentrated likelihood function
is basically the ordinary likelihood function only that the elements of the variance-covariance
matrix of the error-terms (W) are concentrated out by using an analytical code for the ML
estimates of these elements. This function will be much easier to maximize since you avoid the
risk of "getting stuck" in an area with guesses of W that are not positive definite.
Still, even fitting a concentrated likelihood function will not solve all problems since the
resulting estimates are based on a model where there is no covariance between the estimates
of the concentrated model and the estimates of the W elements. Hence to get correct standard
errors you need to re-estimate the full model (with the standard likelihood function), but now
you can use the estimates from the concentrated model as initial values for the maximization
process. This will make sure that the computer does not get lost on its way to the maximum,
and the resulting estimates get correct standard errors as well.
Furthermore, it will also be such that when you fit the concentrated likelihood, your results
might not be robust. By robust I mean that if you re-estimate the model, you will get con-
vergence for the same likelihood value, but slightly different coefficient estimates. Again, the
advice from Gould, Pitblado, and Sribney (2003) is to first fit a "constant only" model, which
is a model where the only explanatory variable in each equation is a constant. The estimates
of the two constants can then be used as initial values when you fit the concentrated model.
Giving it these initial values will be enough to secure robust estimates every time.
5.4.2 Regarding maximization and the CCI model
There is one final remark, and that is related to the special-case of estimating this nonlinear
SUR model involving a common, unobservable variable fitted with a spline function.
32In Stata-language a code that only provides the log likelihood function is an lf-code. One that provides the
gradient analytically is a d1-code, while one that provides both the gradient and the Hessian analytically is a
d2-code.
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As we saw in Section 4.2.3, one of the coefficients attached to the CCI-variable had to be
normalized to some value to secure identification. Clearly, this normalization should not affect
the estimates (except for the scale of CCI and g). But when I tried to fit either the standard or
the concentrated likelihood function, I found that the choice of normalization actually mattered.
Changing the normalization changed all the estimates (and it also made the model converge at
a different log likelihood value).
This problem is taken care of by the gamma-concentrated likelihood function. By imposing
the MLE of g˜ directly (and also change the gradient and the Hessian), the procedure became
"balanced" in the sense that the choice of normalization was irrelevant. With this code a change
of normalization only changed the scale of the CCI-estimate and the inverse of your previous g˜
estimate was returned.
Knowing that our estimates are unaffected by the normalization is satisfying, but why do we
think the problem occurred for the simpler codes? When we inspect our results further it turns
out that the gamma-concentrated model actually replicates the estimates from the concentrated
model that had the highest log-likelihood value. I.e. one of the normalizations led us to the
correct maximum, while the "wrong" normalization caused the code to settle at another local
maximum.33 With the gamma-concentrated model we do not have to worry about choosing the
correct normalization.
5.4.3 Strategy for estimation
Based on the discussion in the last subsections, it is clear that we need to write three different
codes, and then combine all three of them in a final routine. We write a code for the gamma-
concentrated likelihood function, where the gradient and the Hessian are found analytically
based on equations (C.54) and (C.59). We write one code for the concentrated likelihood
function, where the gradient and the (approximated) Hessian are provided analytically based
on equations (C.42) and (C.43). Finally, we write a code for the ordinary likelihood function,
where the gradient and the Hessian are provided analytically based on equations (C.9) and
(C.11).34 Instead of writing a code for the constant only model, we will use the standard SUR
command that Stata provides.
We combine the usage of these three codes in our final routine. This routine is consis-
tent with that recommended by Gould, Pitblado, and Sribney (2003) (except for the gamma-
concentrated part, which is our own addition). Section 5.4.1 outlined the general principles we
33But I have not been able to detect any pattern that can explain which normalization that is the wrong one, ex
ante.
34These codes are modified versions of codes provided in Gould, Pitblado, and Sribney (2003). The concen-
trated code is based on mysuregc_d2.adowhile the ordinary likelihood code is based on mysureg_d1.ado – but
both codes have significant extensions. The gamma-concentrated code is a further extension of the concentrated
code.
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had to follow, and when we include the considerations from Section 5.4.2 as well our routine
can be described as:
 Step 1: Use the constant-only model to find initial values for the constants.
 Step 2: Use the initial values calculated in step 1 to fit the model for the concentrated
likelihood with g˜ constrained to equal 1 to find initial values for the parameters inF1,F2
and the constants.35
 Step 3: Use the initial values calculated in Step 2 to fit the model for the gamma-
concentrated likelihood function. This code will locate the actual optimum of the likeli-
hood function. Use the results of Fˆ1, Fˆ2 and Bˆ2 to calculate ˆ˜gML and WˆML. Provide all
these values as initial values for the next step.
 Step 4: Use the initial values calculated in Step 3 to fit the model for the ordinary like-
lihood function. This will produce the final estimates (and the likelihood remains at the
optimum located in Step 3). The model should and will converge immediately (but with
slightly different coefficient-estimates compared to the gamma-concentrated fitting).
The routine has been written into a Stata command with the name estimate_cci such that
redoing the estimation and updating the results in the future is very easy. When in Stata, you
just type
estimate_cci y1 y2 z, cci(d‘minyear’ d‘minyear+1’ ... d‘maxyear’)
where y1 and y2 are your endogenous variables, z contains all the exogenous variables and
d‘t’ is the sum of all the quarterly shift dummies that belong to year t.36
35This step is not described in any of the preceding sections, but it serves just as a "constant-only" step prior to
the fitting of the gamma-concentrated likelihood and it secures "robust" results.
36At present time the code only permits a system with 2 equations – an extension of the code is left for future
work.
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6 Results
I fit the model in (4.11) using the Stata command estimate_cci that I have prepared. Con-
stants and seasonal dummies are included in each equation. Furthermore, to permit some flex-
ibility I choose to "split up" Dyt by moving Dinct over to the right-hand side (and include it as
any other variable), leaving the growth of the debt-variables alone on the left-hand side.37
My dataset covers the period 1975Q4-2009Q1 for all the levels variables. Since we need
D’s and lagged values, the estimation period begins in 1976Q1. The spline function is included
as a sum of quarterly shift dummies. Since shift dummies for the same year are assumed to
have the same coefficients I add them together to get "smooth" year dummies instead: the
dummy for year i takes the value zero prior to year i, the value 0.25 in the first quarter of year
i, 0.5 in the second quarter, 0.75 in the third and 1 from the 4th quarter and onward. I include
year-dummies for 1977-2008. 1976 is dropped as it would be almost like a constant term.
Let us define a set of CCI assumptions. These are based on the information presented in
Chapters 2-3 and summarized in Section 4.1.1.
CCI assumptions: Assume that, given the values of primres and addreq, there is no posi-
tive increase in the CCI before 1980. In the period 1984-1987, I assume that the CCI
grows the whole time. I also assume that the CCI grows in the period 2004-2007. In
2008 I assume that it decreases. These assumptions translate into sign-restrictions for the
dummy-coefficients.
The assumptions reflect the deregulation in the 1980s and also the positive trend in the late
1990s and 2000s as identified by the mortgage survey of Finanstilsynet. Note that I choose not
to make any strong assumptions regarding the period covering the banking crisis: I naturally
expect credit conditions to tighten in this period, but I will leave it to the index to determine
this. I also permit the index to drop somewhat in late 90s/early 2000s. This is both motivated
by the increase in risk weight for some mortgages in 1998 (see Chapter 2) and the turbulence
related to the Asian crisis and the dot-com bubble and bust.
When the system is estimated, the CCI assumptions will be imposed sequentially. First I
estimate the system in full generality. Then all the CCI assumptions are checked. Among the
coefficients that have violated their sign-restriction, I set the one with the largest p-value (from a
one-sided likelihood ratio test) to zero. Next, I estimate the system once more (incorporating the
new constraint), and test the remaining assumptions. If none of the coefficients have the wrong
sign, I can move on to remove insignificant variables (judged at a 5 % level of significance).
For every insignificant variable I drop, I return to the CCI assumptions and check if they are
satisfied. All this is repeated until we can go through the CCI assumptions without finding
37When this was done, we subtracted inflation from both growth in debt and income to make them real growth
rates.
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any violations and see that all the remaining coefficients are significant. For a variable to be
deemed as insignificant, it must be insignificant both in a partial and in a joint likelihood ratio
test. As base for the joint tests I use the log-likelihood value from the first step after the last
time a CCI assumption was violated.
6.1 Estimates
When the model was estimated, the coefficients for 1978-79, and 2006-08 were all set to zero
due to violation of their CCI assumption. However, only that of 2008 was significantly doing
so. After this I removed, step-by-step, 27 coefficients. These were all taken out due to lack
of significance; at each step I checked if any of the remaining CCI assumptions were violated,
but none were. The main guideline for removing insignificant coefficients was to remove the
least significant, but this rule was not followed without informed exceptions.38 The estimates
are summarized in Table 6.1, and the implied model is:
Dsd = 0:2418iexpt 0:3043Dit 0:6653Dut 0:1053ecm1t 1 (6.1)
Dusd = 0:2258Dinct 0:4027Dit 0:7021Dut 0:5595ecm2t 1 (6.2)
with the ecm-terms given as
ecm1 = sˆd  constant1  seasonals1 0:52hˆw 0:16 ˆmliq CCI (6.3)
ecm2 = ˆusd  constant2  seasonals2 0:25 ˆliq 12:99FTB 3:00CCI (6.4)
In the secured debt equation we see that most coefficients have their expected signs. The excep-
tion seems to be the coefficient of iexp, but there may be ways to partly rationalize this result.
One explanation could be that this just illustrates many household’s lack of foresightedness –
they do not expect interest rates to increase when iexp is high, it just happens to be the case
that the nominal interest rate is (usually) low when iexp is high. Hence, even though iexp is
the difference between the interest rate on 10-year government bonds and the money market
rate, it might end up as an indicator for (minus) the level of interest rates, causing a lower iexp
to reduce the growth in secured debt. That iexp is normally high when i is low is supported
by Figure 6.1, especially in the latter part of the period. Hence, we are getting an interest rate
effect in through the back door, not a weird expectations effect.39
38If it had been, then [Dsd]incexp, [Dusd]hˆw and the spline-dummy of 1989 would still have been in the model
while [Dusd] ˆliq would have been dropped. These alternative models are not nested, so there are no formal ways
of testing the validity of one relative to the other.
39For those who do not want to reject this as an expectations effect it might argued that the coefficient is positive
because households increase their stock of debt when they expect rates to increase. They do so because they know
that it will be harder for them to get accepted by the bank once the cost of servicing a loan increases. However, I
do not find this argument too compelling.
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Figure 6.1: The interest rate and the expected growth in rates
Looking at the remaining coefficients in the sd equation we see that growth in nominal
interest rates appears to have the negative cash-flow effect we expected. An increase in the
unemployment rate also has a negative impact. This captures both the increased uncertainty
and potentially also some income shock effects. Housing wealth and moderately liquid wealth
(to income) has the expected effects with elasticities of 0.52 and 0.16, respectively. The speed
of adjustment coefficient is 0.11, implying that it will take a little more than 2.5 years for
secured debt to return from a 1 percentage deviation from the estimated long-run equilibrium.
For unsecured debt we find that higher income growth increases the growth in unsecured
debt. A negative impact comes from growth in interest rates and unemployment. Note that these
coefficients are quite similar to those for secured debt. Liquid wealth ends up with a positive
effect with an elasticity of 0.25. It implies that having additional security can lead to a larger
stock of unsecured debt. The proportion of the population aged 20-39 relative to those aged 20-
74 has a very strong and positive effect, with a semi-elasticity of 12.99. The sign seems correct,
but the size of this coefficient is probably too large. This result is discussed further in Section
6.1.4. The CCI is estimated to have a relatively stronger impact on unsecured than secured
debt. This means that unsecured debt responds stronger to changes in the credit conditions than
secured debt, which is reasonable, but this might be too strong and it is therefore also discussed
more in Section 6.1.4. The speed of adjustment is faster for unsecured than secured debt. This
fits well with the fact that unsecured debt is more short-term than secured. Judged by the R2
statistics for the two equations, the model seems to capture about 3/4 of the variation in the
growth of the two debt variables, but remember that the R2 statistic has a less straightforward
interpretation in a SUR model since the errors are correlated.
Based on the estimates of W it seems like the stochastic noise in the growth of unsecured
debt is more volatile than that in the growth of secured, and this too seems reasonable. The
covariance term is in principle not significant, but we have kept it in the model despite this.
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Table 6.1: Maximum likelihood estimates of the model in (4.11)
Dsdt Dusdt
Variable Coef. Std.Err p-valuea Coef. Std.Err p-valuea
iexpt .2418 .0733 .0012 (dropped)
Dit –.3043 .1069 .0051 –.4027 .1711 .0200
Dut –.6653 .2220 .0032 –.7021 .2950 .0189
Dinct (dropped) .2258 .0690 .0012
hˆwt 1 .0548 .0068 .0000 (dropped)
ˆliqt 1 (dropped) .1374 .0596 .0233
ˆmliqt 1 .0168 .0070 .0188 (dropped)
FTBt 1 (dropped) 7.2680 1.1902 .0000
B02ct 1 1 15.9577 4.4427 .0003
sˆdt 1 –.1053 .0153 .0000 (dropped)
ˆusdt 1 (dropped) –.5595 .0740 .0000
Dummy for quarter 2 (dropped) .0082 .0034 .0181
Dummy for quarter 4 .0062 .0027 .0210 (dropped)
Constant .0283 .0120 .0189 –3.4571 .5528 .0000
s11 .0001076 .0000132 .0000
s12 –.0000184 .0000156 0.240
s22 .0002533 .0000313 .0000
R2 .7544 .7328
Log likelihood 781.67392
No. of obs. 133
ap-values are based on LR-tests, except for those of the s ’s and the CCI coefficient of Dusd
which are based on Wald tests.
6.1.1 Cointegration
Taking the long-run coefficients as given, do we find evidence of cointegration? For the vari-
ables entering the long-run relationships of secured and unsecured debt to income to cointe-
grate, the error-correction terms must be stationary. This can be tested using ADF tests as
outlined in Appendix B. At a 5 % level of significance I find, unfortunately, that only the error-
correction term of the unsecured debt equation is stationary (t-value of -3.587 with 4 lags),
while that of secured debt ends up with a t-value of -2.369 (5 lags). However, low power of the
ADF tests is always a problem, making it important to inspect the error-correction terms visu-
ally as well. Figure 6.2 shows the two series. Inspecting the series does not make us surprised
that the upper series fails to end up as stationary, but at the same time it does seem like we
have detected something close to a reasonable long-run relationship. ecm1 starts fluctuating at
around :01 until, first the boom in the late 1980s (leading secured debt over income to exceed
its long-run value) and the bust at the time of the banking crisis. However, from the 2000s it
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seems like it begins fluctuating around a new level (:02) until it drops again around 2008. For
unsecured debt we see a sharp drop in the early 1980s (caused by the drop in the CCI and also
consistent with how we interpreted this drop, see Section 6.1.3), and then a boom through the
80s. When the banking crisis kicks in, the error-term for unsecured debt drops as well, and
afterwards there are no huge deviations from its long-run equilibrium. In total my judgement is
that despite lack of formal evidence, it does seem like we have something close to cointegration
in the sd equation. Formally I detect cointegration for the usd equation, but here we do have
some weird coefficient estimates that confuse the picture.
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Figure 6.2: The error-correction terms.
6.1.2 Diagnostics
Another important criterion for evaluating a model is whether data supports the assumption
that the errors in the model are uncorrelated over time and bi-normally distributed. I can make
my job much simpler if I re-run the model with the restriction s12 = 0 to avoid the bi-normal
distribution when I inspect the residuals. This passes (p-value of 0.2367 from the likelihood
ratio test) and it does not change the estimates much. The resulting residuals can then be tested
using single-equation methods.
Let us first perform a visual diagnostic test. Figure 6.3 shows how the residuals are dis-
tributed and also their autocorrelation. In both histograms I have added a normal density
function with the first two moments equal to the empirical ones for the residual to make the
judgement simpler. For both residuals it looks like assuming a normal distribution is a quite
46
good approximation. It seems like autocorrelation is not an issue for the secured debt equation,
but potentially for that of unsecured debt.
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Figure 6.3: Visual diagnostics for residuals (top panels are for the residuals from the sd-
equation, bottom for the usd-equation). Their frequency (left panels) and autocorrelograms
(right panels).
Secondly we can perform more formal diagnostic tests. To test for autocorrelation I run
Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier tests (see description in Greene (2003, Chapter 12)).
When testing for autocorrelation of order p for residual i, eˆi, the test statistic is LM = TR2,
with R2 defined as the standard statistic from the regression
eˆit = b 0xit +
p
å
j=1
rieˆi;t  j (6.5)
where xit is the vector of variables from the final form of equation i = 1;2. The missing val-
ues for the lagged residuals are replaced by zeros in the regression. As LM is asymptotically
distributed c2(p), this is a test it is easy to implement.
Normality is tested for by conducting two different tests. The first combines tests on the
skewness and on the kurtosis, as suggested by D’Agostino, Balanger, and D’Agostino Jr. (1990)
and implemented as the command sktest in Stata. The second is a Shapiro-Wilk test for
normality due to Shapiro and Wilk (1965), implemented as the command swilk in Stata.
Table 6.2 gives the results, and none of the p-values give evidence for rejecting the null-
hypothesis of no autocorrelation. Neither can normality be rejected in any of the two tests.
Hence, based on the residuals, it seems like the model is well-specified.
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Table 6.2: Diagnostics
Normality Autocorrelation
p-value (sktest) p-value (swilk) Lags p-value
eˆ1 .451 .8367 1 .6814
2 .9192
3 .9825
4 .9966
5 .9994
eˆ2 .0809 .1715 1 .7918
2 .9658
3 .9952
4 .9994
5 .9999
6.1.3 The estimated CCI
As already noted, the dummies for 1978, 1979, 2006 and 2008 were set to zero due to violation
of their CCI assumption. Furthermore, I dropped the dummies for 1977, 1983, 1989-90, 1992-
93, 1995-96, 1998 and 2002 due to their lack of significance. primres and addreq were also
dropped due to insignificance. The estimates are summarized in Table 6.3 and the CCI is
graphed in Figure 6.4. Please remember that an increase in CCI should be interpreted as an
easing of credit conditions.
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Figure 6.4: The estimated CCI, 1975Q4-2008Q4.
The shape of the index is close to what I hoped for, given the qualitative information sum-
marized in earlier chapters, even though it begins with a quite sharp contraction in 1980-81.
However from 1982 it increases rapidly until its peak in the end of 1987. The first drop in
the index seems a bit peculiar given what we know about the institutional development. But
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the dip could capture that this was a period of strong growth in the grey market, making the
amount of "white" debt increase less than what the fundamentals implied, causing the index to
fall. Furthermore, there might also be lagged effects from the contractive policies at the end of
the 1970s. The increase in 1982-87 is easier to interpret: this clearly captures the effects of the
deregulation, leaving fewer households credit constrained.
The index drops in 1988-94, corresponding to the period of the banking crisis. This too
seems reasonable, even though some might claim that the drop should have been even greater.
At the bottom in 1994 the index is back to its mid-1986 level. From 1995 and onwards there
are no other negative reversals in the index and it increases quite steadily. By 1999 the index is
back to its 1987 level, and ends at more than double this level in 2005. This increase probably
reflects a reduction in credit constraints not driven by deregulation, but by financial innovation
and the introduction of such instruments as home equity credit lines, and also potentially the
internationalization of capital flows and availability of credit for Norwegian banks. Increased
competition in the banking sector can also have been a factor. However, it might be that the
index grows too much between 1997 and 2005: one potential reason is discussed in Section
6.1.4.
Table 6.3: CCI estimates (B02)
Sum of qd’s for: Coef. Std.Error p-valuea
1980 –.0067 .0018 .0000
1981 –.0056 .0017 .0003
1982 .0045 .0014 .0000
1984 .0062 .0017 .0000
1985 .0057 .0016 .0000
1986 .0068 .0019 .0000
1987 .0071 .0019 .0000
1988 –.0026 .0010 .0004
1991 –.0047 .0012 .0000
1994 –.0020 .0007 .0005
1997 .0060 .0015 .0000
1999 .0039 .0012 .0001
2000 .0040 .0013 .0005
2001 .0036 .0012 .0005
2003 .0044 .0013 .0000
2004 .0046 .0014 .0001
2005 .0028 .0011 .0057
ap-values are based on LR-tests
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6.1.4 Reasonable and relevant results?
I have presented a model which, with a few noted exceptions, has long-run coefficients that are
plausible, residuals that seem to be normally distributed and without autocorrelation, and an
implied credit conditions index that has a shape that seems to capture most of what I expected
it to. But getting flawless results would be "too good to be true", and there are of course signs
of weaknesses left. In particular, I do not find strong evidence of cointegration in the equation
for secured debt, and in that of unsecured debt I get at least two quite unreasonable coefficients
(that of FTB and partly that of CCI). Furthermore the CCI potentially grows too much during
the last part of our sample.
I suspect that these problems are in large part the symptom of omitting one important mech-
anism: the potential for substitution between secured and unsecured debt. As secured debt is
normally cheaper than unsecured debt, secured debt will be preferred to unsecured. Thus an
agent will never increase his amount of unsecured debt if he has the possibility of taking up
secured debt instead. We may call this uni-directional substitution. However, there is no rea-
son to expect this to be a central mechanism in a credit-rationed regime, such as Norway in the
early 1980s. But as the credit markets were liberalized this mechanism should become more
important, especially when home equity credit lines made secured credit even more available
during the 2000s. For instance, if an agent needed credit in order to purchase a new car in the
early 1990s it was probably necessary to take up a car loan. On the contrary, in 2008 the agent
might just draw on his/her home equity credit line instead.
This implies that there might be two separate effects on the amount of both secured and
unsecured debt from financial liberalization. First we have the direct effect: more liberalized
credit markets makes credit more available. This corresponds to what we have modelled as the
CCI-effect. Second we have the indirect effect: in a more deregulated regime the degree of
uni-directional substitution might increase, and households switch from unsecured to secured
credit. This is an effect that is left out in our model, but we would expect it to be a mechanism
that starts working some time in the 1990s.
If this really is the problem, how should it have affected my estimates? In the secured debt
equation, the positive boost from the substitution may have caused one of the wealth variables
to have a too large effect. It might also have caused a positive push to the credit conditions
index, causing it to increase more during the last third of our period than what it "structurally"
should have done. What about the equation for unsecured debt? In lack of the substitution
effect, we should have seen one of the other variables causing a too negative impact after the
mid-1990s. Conveniently, it might actually be that parts of this negative trend is captured in the
coefficient of FTB. As we see in Figure B.4, FTB starts declining in the mid 1980s, and drops
at a steady rate after around 1995. Hence, by giving FTB an unreasonably large coefficient,
parts of the substitution effect is taken account of. Furthermore, since FTB starts dropping a
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bit too early to act as the "perfect trend", this might also cause the relative CCI coefficient to be
too large in order to counter-act the negative impulses from FTB in the late 80s. This can also
have pushed the CCI to fall too little during the banking crisis.
My preliminary conclusion is therefore that parts of the large coefficient on both FTB and
CCI in the unsecured debt equation, and also the possibly too strong growth of the CCI in
the end of the period, reflect that households are substituting from unsecured to secured debt,
reducing the long-run level of unsecured debt and correspondingly increasing that of secured
debt. This could also explain why the error-correction term of secured debt seems to settle at
a higher level at the end of the 90s while the error-correction term of unsecured debt stays at a
low level after the banking crisis. This would also explain why I do not find striking evidence
for cointegration, but at the same time why it seems like I have detected relationships that make
some sense.
6.2 Comparison with results from other studies
As already noted, Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) estimate a 10 equation system,
where two of the equations are equations for the log of secured and unsecured debt. The long-
run relationship they find, using UK data for the period of 1976Q1-2004Q4, are (found in
Tables A1 and A2):
sˆd = 0:59inccap 1:81 ˆliq+0:07 ˆilliq+0:29hˆw+3:7DEM+4:68CCI (6.6)
ˆusd = 0:59inccap 0:29 ˆliq+0:07 ˆilliq 0:11hˆw+0:18cred+2:08CCI (6.7)
where xˆ = log(X=INC), inccap is the real income per capita, ILLIQ is defined approximately
as the sum of our variablesMLIQ and ILLIQ, DEM is the share of people aged 20-34 and cred
is the log ratio of the number of credit cards relative to the adult population. In addition these
equations include various interest rate effects and they also contain some risk-terms (involving
among other things the volatility of interest rates and inflation). The implied CCI was given in
Figure 1.1 (labeled "No interaction") above.
Compared to my results we see that they find a positive effect from income per capita. The
elasticities of housing wealth and illiquid wealth for secured debt are in the same region as
mine. For unsecured debt they get an opposite effect of liquid wealth, but my estimate might
capture some of the positive impact from illiquid wealth as well. Contrary to my results, they
find that the CCI has more than twice as large impact on secured debt to income relative to
unsecured debt.
A Norwegian study it is relevant for us to compare my results with is Jacobsen and Naug
(2004). They estimate an equation for household’s total stock of debt using data for the pe-
riod of 1994Q1-2004Q4. They do not control for any changes in the credit conditions, but
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comparing our estimates with theirs is still of interest. Their long-run relationship is:
debt = hw 1:7i+0:17turnover+0:64student (6.8)
where debt is approximately the log of SD+USD, hw and i are defined as we do (using slightly
different sources), turnover is a variable measuring the number of trades made in the housing
market during a quarter and student is the share of students aged 20-24 relative to the rest of
the population.
This study supports our result that some form of a demographic variable should be included,
and also that our variable probably gets a too large coefficient. They find a much stronger
housing wealth effect than us, but they ignore the other wealth effects that appear in our model.
In a study of bank lending and property prices in Hong Kong, Gerlach and Peng (2005)
find that the logs of real bank lending (credit), real GDP (gdp) and real property prices (hp)
cointegrate and that it is bank lending that error-corrects. Their long-run equation is:
credit = gdp+0:36hp (6.9)
In their dynamic model for bank lending, they also show how a regulatory change in 1991
(when banks in Hong Kong started to apply stricter loan-to-value limits) has a significantly
negative impact on how strong house price changes affects the growth in credit. However, this
is not taken into account in the long-run analysis.
Hofmann (2004) has much of the same starting-point as Gerlach and Peng (2005), but con-
siders the evidence for 16 different countries. Two different long-run relationships are posited,
one where the log of credit is determined by the log of GDP and the real rate of interest, and
one where the log of property prices is added as well. Hofmann finds that the specifications
ignoring property prices fail to detect cointegration in 11 out of 16 countries, but the one that
includes property prices detects cointegration in 15 out of 16 countries. The relationships vary
across countries, and the long-run equation for Norway is:
credit = 2:369gdp 0:077r+3:828hp (6.10)
Both these studies indicate that income and house prices are central determinants for the
stock of debt, but the coefficients of Hofmann (2004) are much bigger than those implied by
our model.
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7 Conclusions
This thesis has provided an estimate of a credit conditions index (CCI) for Norway, based on the
framework and methodology of Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006). The index has a
shape close to our ex ante expectations, even though the model used to produce it is plagued
with some problems. There is no reason to believe that this is "the" index, but it should neither
be dismissed as irrelevant. In lack of better measures, this index provides a fine opportunity
to control for the institutional changes that have occurred since the mid 1970s. It is likely that
ignoring such changes is worse than applying an imperfect index.
As important as the estimates on their own are the steps that were taken prior to estimation.
This thesis has documented the institutional development in a detailed fashion, making this
knowledge more available than what it has been earlier. Having some idea of how the dereg-
ulation took place is essential for other researchers that are to perform studies related to the
Norwegian credit markets, and Chapter 2 can therefore serve some useful purposes. Further-
more, the maximum likelihood framework that is used to estimate the model is documented
quite extensively. If future researchers want to use model formulations that are difficult to im-
plement using the nonlinear SUR commands that are available in standard statistical software,
this documentation can serve as a good starting point if they are to write their own maximum
likelihood codes.
In my opinion, future research related to the topic of credit condition indices can follow
two alternative strategies. The first is to stay within the framework of Fernandez-Corugedo
and Muellbauer (2006), which is what I attempted to in this thesis. This strategy, as I interpret
it, entails that you use indicators for the credit conditions that are as "pure" as possible in
order to support the argument that you detect a true structural trend. An ideal set of indicators
mixes both micro and macro observations and the indicators should also preferably be based on
variables that are not of particular interest in other applications. The various loan-to-value and
loan-to-income ratios constructed by Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) are perfect
examples. The estimated CCI will then, if results come out as intended, represent the common
structural trend in these variables and can be used directly in other applications as an ordinary
variable.
What I interpret as the second strategy is more closely related to parts of Blake and Muell-
bauer (2009). This study does produce CCI estimates, but the CCI methodology is mainly
being used to control for the credit conditions in an analysis where the main purpose is to es-
timate equations for house prices and the stock of debt. Hence, instead of first estimating a
CCI and then apply it in a model, the two things are done simultaneously. This reduces the
structural interpretation of the CCI somewhat, and it might be difficult to estimate equations
for your left-hand side variables that are satisfactory if the purpose is to e.g. produce forecasts
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for these variables. However, it might be argued that a simple model could be used to estimate
the CCI as a first step, and then a second step could condition on the estimated CCI and use it in
a model with more flexible dynamics. Alternatively one could pursue a strategy similar to that
of Williams (2009) and use a stochastic trend to determine where the important break points of
the CCI are. But this hinges on the possibility of including a common stochastic trend in all the
equations of your system, something as far as I am aware of is not possible in any statistical
software at present time.
My primary suggestion for future work is to stay within the main framework applied in this
thesis, at least at first. The most pressing challenge is to think of a way to incorporate the shift
from unsecured to secured debt that I believe has happened. One should also search for other
potential credit indicators. If this does not succeed, the second strategy should also be given a
try. A way to expand the analysis could be to include an equation for aggregate consumption
and let the CCI be interacted with e.g. wealth variables or the interest rate. Another alternative
could be a house price equation where the income-response is interacted with the CCI. Even if
the attempts with the first strategy are successful, the second strategy could be a useful exercise
to evaluate the robustness of the CCI estimates.
54
References
ARON, J., J. MUELLBAUER, AND A. MURPHY (2008): “Housing Wealth, Credit Conditions
and UK Consumption,” Working paper, paper presented at the ESEM conference in Milano,
August 2008.
BASEL COMMITEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION (2004): “International Convergence of
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework,” Available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf.
BERG, S. A., AND Ø. EITRHEIM (2009): “Bank Regulation and Bank Crisis,” Working Paper
2009/18, Norges Bank.
BLAKE, J., AND J. MUELLBAUER (2009): “Developing analytical methods for the iden-
tification of imbalance and risks in the EU housing markets,” Discussion paper, Version
20090916b, September 2009.
BLANCHARD, O., G. DELL’ARICCIA, AND P. MAURO (2010): “Rethinking Macroeconomic
Policy,” Staff Position Note January, International Montary Fund.
D’AGOSTINO, R. B., A. BALANGER, AND R. B. D’AGOSTINO JR. (1990): “A suggestion
for using powerful and informative tests for normality,” American Statistician, 44, 316–321.
DEBELLE, G. (2004): “Household debt and the macroeconomy,” Quarterly review 2004/1,
Bank for International Settlements.
DYLAN, B. (1965): Track #1 (Subterranean Homesick Blues) from the album Bringing It All
Back Home. Columbia Records, New York.
EIDE, L. (1973): “The Norwegian Monetary and Credit System,” Norges Bank Occasional
Papers, 1.
EITRHEIM, Ø., J. T. KLOVLAND, AND J. F. E. QVIGSTAD (2004): “Historical monetary
statistics for Norway 1819-2003,” Norges Bank Occasional Papers, 35.
ENGLE, R. F., AND C. W. J. GRANGER (1987): “Co-Integration and Error Correction: Repre-
sentation, Estimation and testing,” Econometrica, 55, 251–276.
FERNANDEZ-CORUGEDO, E., AND J. MUELLBAUER (2006): “Consumer credit conditions in
the United Kingdom,” Working Paper 314, Bank of England.
FINANSDEPARTEMENTET (1969a-2007a): “St. prp. nr. 1 (Nasjonalbudsjettet),” (The National
Budget (only available in Norwegian)).
55
FINANSDEPARTEMENTET (1970b-2008b): “St. prp. nr. 2 (Revidert Nasjonalbudsjett),” (The
Revised National Budget (only available in Norwegian)).
FINANSTILSYNET (1986a-2008a): “Årsmelding,” The Annual Report by the Financial Super-
visory Authority of Norway (available in English for the period 1993-2008). Available at
http://www.finanstilsynet.no.
(1999b-2009b): “Boliglånsundersøkelsen,” The mortgage survey of the Finan-
cial Supervisory Authority of Norway (only available in Norwegian). Available at
http://www.finanstilsynet.no.
GERLACH, S., AND W. PENG (2005): “Bank lending and property prices in Hong Kong,”
Journal of Banking and Finance, 29, 461–481.
GOODHART, C. A. E., B. HOFMANN, AND M. SEGOVIANO (2004): “Bank Regulation and
Macroeconomic Fluctuations,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 20(4), 591–615.
GOODHART, C. A. E., P. SUNRIRAD, AND D. TSOMOCOS (2004): “A model to Analyse
Financial Fragility: Applications,” Journal of Financial Stability, 1, 107–142.
GOULD, W., J. PITBLADO, AND W. SRIBNEY (2003): Maximum Likelihood Estimation with
Stata, 2nd edition. Stata Press.
GRANGER, C. W. J. (1990): “General introduction. Where are the Controversies in Economet-
ric Methodology?,” inModelling economic series, ed. by C. W. J. Granger, pp. 1–23. Oxford
University Press, New York.
GRANGER, C. W. J., AND P. NEWBOLD (1974): “Spurious Regressions in Econometrics,”
Journal of Econometrics, 2, 111–120.
GREENE, W. H. (2003): Econometric analysis, 5th edition. Prentice Hall, New Jersey.
GRØNVIK, G. (1994): “Bankregulering og bankatferd 1975-1991,” Norges Bank Occasional
Papers, 22, English title: ’Bank regulation and bank behaviour’ (only available in Norwe-
gian).
HAMILTON, J. D. (1994): Time Series Aanalysis. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
HATZIUS, J., P. HOOPER, F. MISHKIN, K. L. SCHOENHOLTZ, AND M. W. WATSON (2010):
“Financial Conditions Indexes: A Fresh Look after the Financial Crisis,” Draft: April 13,
2010.
HOFMANN, B. (2004): “The Determinants of Bank Credit in Industrialized Countries: Do
Property Prices Matter?,” International Finance, 7, 203–234.
56
JACOBSEN, D. H., AND B. NAUG (2004): “What influences the growth of household debt?,”
Economic Bulletin (Norges Bank), (3/2004), 103–111.
JOHANSEN, S. (1988): “Statistical analysis of cointegration vectors,” Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 12, 231–254.
KAMINSKY, G. L., AND S. L. SCHMUKLER (2003): “Short-Run Pain, Long-Run Gain: The
Effects of Financial Liberalization,” Working Paper 9787, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
KOOPMAN, S. J., A. C. HARVEY, J. A. DOORNIK, AND N. SHEPHARD (2000): STAMP:
Structural Time series Analyser, Modeller and Predictor. Timberlake Consultants, London.
KROGH, T. S. H. (2010): “A credit conditions index for Norway,” Master’s thesis, University
of Oslo.
MOE, T. G., J. A. SOLHEIM, AND B. VALE (EDS.) (2004): “The Norwegian Banking Crisis,”
Norges Bank Occasional Papers, 33.
MUELLBAUER, J., AND A. MURPHY (1993): “Income Expectations, Wealth and Demography
in the Aggregate UK Consumption Function,” Working paper, First Draft. For presentation
at H.M Treasury Academic Panel, June 1993.
NORGES BANK (1970a-2008a): “Årsmelding,” (The Annual Report from the Central Bank of
Norway (available in English as well)).
(1983b-1989b): “Vedlagte tabeller,” Penger og Kreditt (Norges Bank), 4/19xx, English
title: ’Tables in the Appendix’ (only available in Norwegian).
NORWEGIAN OFFICIAL REPORTS (1980): “Rentepolitikk,” NOU 1980:4, The Ministry of
Finance, English title: ’Interest rate policy’ (only available in Norwegian).
(1983): “Om mål og virkemidler i penge- og kredittpolitikken,” NOU 1983:29, The
Ministry of Finance, English title: ’Targets and instruments for the credit and monetary
policy’ (only available in Norwegian).
(1989): “Penger og kreditt i en omstillingstid,” NOU 1989:1, The Ministry of Finance,
English title: ’Money and Credit in changing times’ (only available in Norwegian).
(1992): “Report by the Commision on the Banking Crisis,” NOU 1992:30E, The
Ministry of Finance.
(1995): “Statsbankene under endrede rammevilkår,” NOU 1995:11, The Ministry of
Finance, English title: ’The new role of State banks’ (only available in Norwegian).
57
OXFORD ECONOMICS (2009): “Imbalances in EU housing markets,” Economic Outlook, 33,
19–25, October, London Business School.
REINHART, C. M., AND K. S. ROGOFF (2008): “Is the 2007 U.S. Subprime Crisis So Differ-
ent? An International Historical Comparison,” American Economic Review, 98, 339–344.
SHAPIRO, S. S., AND M. B. WILK (1965): “An analysis of variance tests for normality (com-
plete samples),” Biometrika, 52, 591–611.
STATACORP (2007): Stata Statistical Software: Release 10, College Station, TX: Statacorp LP.
WILLIAMS, D. (2009): “House prices and financial liberalisation in Australia,” MPRA Paper
15212, University Library of Munich, Germany.
ZELLNER, A. (1962): “An Efficient Method of Estimating Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
and Tests for Aggregation Bias,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 57, 348–
368.
58
A Documentation of the data
A.1 Method for extracting a seasonal pattern
First, let us look at how one can construct quarterly series for a variable even though you only
have annual observations of it. To do so you need quarterly observations of another variable
that you think has a similar seasonal pattern.
Let us consider the variable X . Let Xt be the value of X at time t (the time interval is
quarters). For the period t = 0;1;2; :::;T , we have observed Xt˜ for t˜ = 0;4;8; :::;T (assuming
T refers to a fourth quarter). We also have data for a variable Y . For this variable we have full
quarterly observations. We believe that the seasonal pattern of Y is quite close to that of X . Is
there any way to use Y to construct quarterly observations of X?
I propose a method where we force X to have the same quarterly growth rate as Y , only
adjusted for a shift-component ai unique for each year i. If X and Y have identical values
both at the end of year i  1 and i, we want ai = 0. If X grows and Y drops during year i
we want ai > 0 and vice versa. Let pt be the growth rate of Y in period t. Given the value
of ai we construct quarterly observations according to the formula Xt = (1+ pt +ai)Xt 1 for
t = zi+1;zi+2;zi+3, where zi is the constant such that the values of t belong to year i. Since
we want the numbers to "add up" within every year, the shift-component ai is implicitly defined
by:
Xzi+4
Xzi
= (1+ pzi+1+ai)(1+ pzi+2+ai)(1+ pzi+3+ai)(1+ pzi+4+ai) (A.1)
for any value i that refers to a year in the set of observations.
For practical purposes, solving this non-linear equation for every year is a bit time consum-
ing, so it might be better to use an approximation:40
ai 

Xzi+4
Xzi
  (1+ pi0)  pi1pzi+4  pi2pzi+3  pi3pzi+2

4+3pi
(A.2)
where
pi j =
zi+4  j
å
t=zi+1
pt
for j = 0;1;2;3.41
40This approximation is somewhat arbitrary as it simply cuts off some of the remaining terms, but these terms
will never be of any great size.
41Note that you should not "regenerate" X in the fourth quarter if ai is approximated.
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A.2 Constructing series for secured and unsecured debt
Our main source42 (MS) is a dataset which gives us series for total loans to households and
total loans for housing purposes to households from commercial banks, savings banks, the Post
Office Savings Bank, loan associations and state banks.43 For the two first institutions we have
yearly observations for 1975-1987, and monthly thereafter. For the Post Office Savings Bank
the monthly data starts in 1993, and for the latter two in 1996.
To supplement the main source we have one supplementary source44 (SS) which has quar-
terly observations for 1975Q1-2009Q1 for total loans to household from commercial banks,
savings banks, the Post Office Savings Bank, loan associations, state banks, financing compa-
nies, life insurance companies45 and non-life insurance companies.
To get quarterly series for secured debt (SD) and unsecured debt (USD) we go through the
following steps:
1. Get quarterly observations for total loans from commercial banks, savings banks, the
Post Office Savings Bank, loan associations and state banks from MS in the period such
observations lack by applying the method described in Section A.1 with the equivalent
series from SS as a basis for the seasonal pattern.
2. Get full series for total loans from financing companies, life insurance companies and
non-life insurance companies by adopting the entire series from SS.
3. Get quarterly observations for loans for housing purposes from commercial banks, sav-
ings banks, the Post Office Savings Bank, loan associations and state banks from MS in
the period such observations lack by applying the method described in Section A.1 with
the series on total loans from the respective institutions in MS as a basis for the seasonal
pattern.
4. Get series for secured and unsecured debt. Make the assumption that all loans for housing
purposes are secured, and that all remaining loans are unsecured. For financing compa-
nies, life insurance companies and non-life insurance companies, we do not have any
division between loans and housing loans. Here we assume that all loans from financing
42Source: Statistics Norway
43For state banks the series from MS contains an error in the period of 1990-1994 as it suddenly shifts down
by 25 percent and then up again in 1995Q1. Luckily, the series from the supplementary source is correct, and
we’ll use these observations in this period (the series match perfectly prior to 1990 and after 1994). To correct the
housing loan series we add an element in every year (this is done before we obtain quarterly observations) such
that housing loans’ share of total loans remains the same as before the correction.
44Source: Norges Bank’s database FINDATR. The data series end in 2003, and the observations after that are
appended from the database which succeeded FINDATR, FINSE (produced at Statistics Norway).
45When we append the FINSE numbers, we add together life insurance companies, pension funds, bonds and
certificates to get the whole category ’life insurance’ consistent with FINDATR.
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companies are unsecured, and that all loans from life and non-life insurance companies
are secured.
The first step is uncontroversial, but the last steps might be less so. I admit that this is not pro-
ducing perfect series, and that some of the remaining "unsecured debt" is potentially secured.
But it is much better than nothing. Remember also that it is only the seasonal pattern that gets
a little bit wrong, the level is correct through the whole series since we always have at least one
observation in every year.
A.3 Other variables
Most other variables have been extracted from the database of Statistics Norway without any
modifications. INC is given as household’s net income (RD300 from Statistics Norway) minus
dividends (RAM300). HW is defined as the price per unit of housing capital (PBOL) times
households’ stock of housing (K83). i is 4 times the average quarterly interest rate house-
holds are facing (RENPF300). r is i times 1  t minus the yearly inflation rate where t is the
capital tax rate (TRTMNW). The inflation rate is based on the Norwegian CPI (KPI). u is the
unemployment rate (URKORR). FTB is based on various population numbers from Statistics
Norway.
To get iexp I use the difference between the interest rate on Norwegian 10-year government
bonds and the money market rate. Data on the interest rate on Norwegian 10-year government
bonds from 1985Q1-2009Q1 and on the money market rate (3 month NIBOR) from 1978Q3-
2009Q1 were extracted from the web site of Norges Bank (www.norges-bank.no). Data on
the bond rate prior to 1985 was found in Eitrheim, Klovland, and Qvigstad (2004, Chapter 4,
Table A4). Household’s average interest rate is used as a proxy for the money market rate prior
to 1978Q3.
Data for LIQ (households’ holdings of notes, coins and deposits) and MLIQ (households’
holdings of bonds, stocks, loans and other claims) are only available from Statistics Norway
after 1995. To get data prior to 1995 I combine this source with similar data from FINDATR,
Norges Bank’s old data base (updated until 2002/3 but no longer). The levels do not match
perfectly between these sources, so in order to combine them I use the growth rates from the
FINDATR data to create series prior to 1995.
A.3.1 Constructing income expectations
To construct a variable for income expectations I follow a setup similar to that of Muellbauer
and Murphy (1993), also applied in Aron, Muellbauer, and Murphy (2008). I assume that
households in each period use the H latest observations of income to forecast their income
the next k quarters and based on this they construct a measure for the deviation between their
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permanent and current income. Formally I assume that the log deviation between household’s
(expected) permanent income (INCp) and current income (INC) is given by:
iexpt = inc
p
t   inct =
1
åki=1 ai
k
å
i=1
aiEˆtDinct+i (A.3)
where k represents the horizon of the agent, ai are the (possibly varying) discount factors, and
Eˆt is the ’estimations operator’. As in Aron, Muellbauer, and Murphy (2008), I will set k = 12
and ai = 0:85. H is set to 32 – implying 8 years of memory.46 To get estimates for future
income, I assume that the households in every period t use the H latest observations of income
to perform the regression:
Dinct = a t

0 +
5
å
i=1
g t

i Dinct i+ et (A.4)
for t = t0; t1; :::;T . Based on these results they "forecast" future income growth:
EˆtDinct+1 = aˆ t0+
5
å
i=1
gˆ tiDinct+1 i (A.5)
EˆtDinct+2 = aˆ t0+ gˆ
t
1EˆtDinct+1+
5
å
i=2
gˆ tiDinct+2 i (A.6)
EˆtDinct+3 = aˆ t0+
2
å
i=1
gˆ ti EˆtDinct+3 i+
5
å
i=3
gˆ tiDinct+3 i (A.7)
EˆtDinct+4 = aˆ t0+
3
å
i=1
gˆ ti EˆtDinct+4 i+
5
å
i=4
gˆ tiDinct+4 i (A.8)
EˆtDinct+5 = aˆ t0+
4
å
i=1
gˆ ti EˆtDinct+5 i+ gˆ t5Dinct (A.9)
EˆtDinct+ j = aˆ t0+
5
å
i=1
gˆ ti EˆtDinct+ j 1 (A.10)
for j = 6; :::;12.
46With income series starting in 1967Q1, the series for incpt   inct will start in 1975Q1.
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B Tests for stationarity
I apply standard augmented Dickey-Fuller tests to check the degree of integration in the vari-
ables.
B.1 Basic theory
Consider a time series variable Yt which I assume follows the process
Yt = rYt 1+ et (B.1)
A time series Zt is said to be stationary if its distribution has the properties (see definition
in Hamilton (1994, Chapter 3)):
1. E(Zt) = m for all t
2. Cov(Zt ;Zt  j) = g j for all t and all values of j
These requirements only seem reasonable for a few macroeconomic variables. Most macro
variables are growing over time such that we would neither expect the mean nor the variance of
these series to remain constant. Such series are labeled non-stationary. The standard terminiol-
ogy is that a stationary variable is integrated of order 0, giving them the name I(0) variables. A
non-stationary variable is integrated of order d  1 and is called an I(d) variable. The order of
integration d is determined by the number of times the variable must be differenced in order to
make it become stationary. The most common type is I(1) variables. These become stationary
after being differenced once.
What can we say about the the order of integration of Yt? Let us write (B.1) as:
Yt = r jYt  j+
j
å
i=0
r iet i (B.2)
Assume first that jrj < 1 and let j go to infinity. We see that this makes Yt a stationary
variable since its distribution then has the properties:
1. E(Yt) = 0
2. Cov(Yt ;Yt  j) = r
j
1 r2s
2
which fulfill the requirements for begin stationary. Hence, jrj < 1 implies that Yt is an I(0)
variable.
Assume next that r = 1. From (B.2) it is clear that the variance of Yt will be infinite
implying that it cannot be stationary. Rewriting (B.1) we see that DYt = et . The distribution of
DYt has the properties:
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1. E(DYt) = 0
2. Var(DYt) = s2
3. Cov(DYt ;Yt  j) = 0 for j 6= 0
making it a stationary variable. Hence, r = 1 implies that Yt is an I(1) variable.
B.2 Testing for stationarity
Suppose we have T observations ofYt . Motivated by the results in the previous section, it seems
like a good idea to test for stationarity by regressing
DYt = aYt 1+ et (B.3)
for t = 1; :::;T , and then test whether the estimate of a is significantly less than zero. As
a = r   1, this is the same as testing if the estimate of r is significantly less than 1. We
will estimate (B.3) as usual using OLS, but we cannot use ordinary t-tests because if r = 1, the
asymptotic distribution of the OLS estimate is non-standard (see Hamilton (1994, Chapter 17)).
We can still use t-values as our test statistic, but to get the correct distribution of the t-values
we have to use the Dickey-Fuller distribution. This test is a so-called Dickey-Fuller test.
Furthermore, to allow for the error term et to be autocorrelated and also to allow for a time
trend and a constant in (B.3) we will rather estimate the equation (see Hamilton (1994, Chapter
17))
DYt = m+b t+aYt 1+
k
å
i=1
aiDYt i+ et (B.4)
where k is chosen by the researcher to make sure that the resulting residual is without autocor-
relation.47 This is a so-called augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.
Our procedure for testing stationarity will be the following:
1. Estimate (B.4):
(i) Estimate (B.4) with k = 5
(ii) Check if b is significant (using an ordinary t-test), if not: drop it
(iii) Estimate (B.4) (possibly without a trend) again 6 different times (with k =
0;1; :::;5).48
47This implies that you model Yt as an AR(k+1) process.
48Note that the selection of k will involve a slight inconsistency since when we reduce the number of lags by
one, we get one extra observation as well. One could argue that the same number of observations should be used
when testing for all the lags. However, we do give the lag length with the smallest number of observations priority
by testing it first, and this should do more than enough to compensate.
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(iv) Choose the highest possible value of k that results in a significant coefficient on
the kth lag.
(v) If this value of k gives residuals without autocorrelation (using a Breusch-Godfrey
Lagrange multiplier tests as described in Chapter 6), use this equation to test for station-
arity. If not, increase k until the residuals are free of autocorrelation, and use this equation
to test for stationarity.
2. Test the hypothesis H0 : a = 0 against the alternative HA : a < 0.
3. If H0 is rejected, conclude that the variable is stationary
4. If H0 is not rejected, go on to estimate a version of (B.4) with D2Yt instead of DYt and
DYt 1 instead of Yt 1. Use k 1 lags. Do not include a trend.
5. Test the hypothesis H0 : a = 0 against the alternative HA : a < 0.
6. If H0 is rejected, conclude that the variable is I(1)
7. If H0 is not rejected, continue for another step (and so on).
B.3 Results
We have tested all our variables for stationarity. The results are in Table B.1.
Table B.1: ADF tests
The sample 1975Q4-2009Q1 has been used for all variables in levels
Variable k bˆ (t-value) ADF-statistic 5 % critical value
sd 4 .0003162 (2.80) -2.665 -3.446
Dsd 3 - -1.949 -2.888
D2sd 2 - -18.616 -2.888
usd 2 - -1.254 -2.888
Dusd 1 - -4.761 -2.888
inc 5 .0005142 (2.10) -1.544 -3.446
Dinc 4 - -5.444 -2.888
inccap 5 - -2.187 -2.888
Dinccap 4 - -3.905 -2.888
Continued on next page
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Table B.1: Continued from previous page
sˆd 5 .000316 (2.52) -2.779 -3.446
Dsˆd 4 - -2.413 -2.888
D2sˆd 3 - -14.208 -2.888
ˆusd 4 - -2.277 -2.888
D ˆusd 3 - -3.351 -2.888
hw 5 - -0.508 -2.888
Dhw 4 - -3.248 -2.888
hˆw 4 - -2.640 -2.888
Dhˆw 3 - -2.336 -2.888
D2hˆw 2 - -21.826 -2.888
liq 4 - 0.437 -2.888
Dliq 3 - -3.710 -2.888
ˆliq 5 - -2.769 -2.888
D ˆliq 4 - -4.085 -2.888
mliq 5 .0018801 (2.96) -3.000 -3.446
Dmliq 4 - -4.354 -2.888
ˆmliq 4 .0014008 (3.13) -3.420 -3.446
D ˆmliq 3 - -3.525 -2.888
illiq 3 .001163 (2.90) -2.832 -3.446
Dilliq 2 - -4.263 -2.888
ˆilliq 4 - -1.917 -2.888
D ˆilliq 3 - -4.349 -2.888
i 5 -0.0000627 (-2.91) -2.836 -3.446
Di 4 - -3.749 -2.888
Continued on next page
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Table B.1: Continued from previous page
r 0 - -3.017 -2.888
u 4 - -2.677 -2.888
Du 3 - -3.537 -2.888
FTB 6 -0.0000355 (-2.96) -2.691 -3.446
DFTB 5 - -2.169 -2.888
D2FTB 4 - -5.129 -2.888
incexp 5 -.0000653 (-3.98) -5.103 -3.446
iexp 0 - -3.805 -2.888
Based on the tests I interpret usd, ˆusd, inc, inccap, hw, liq, ˆliq, mliq, ˆmliq, illq and ˆilliq as
I(1), while r, incexp and iexp are interpreted as I(0). Even though both hw and inc are I(1), hˆw
shows up as I(2) according to the tests, but graphical inspection (Figure B.1) leads me to accept
an I(1) interpretation. It is the same issue for sd and sˆd: the tests support an I(2) interpretation,
but looking at Figures B.2-B.3 is "enough" for me to accept them as I(1) variables.
It is harder to handle FTB. By definition it must be an I(0) variable (as it is a proportion),
and it would certainly have showed up as that with a sufficient amount of data, but the time it
takes for FTB to look like a stationary variable is a lot longer than the 35 years we are looking
at. Still, in the short-run it makes sense to think of FTB as a stock variable, making an I(1) or
I(2) interpretation more intuitive. If I interpret Figure B.4 with some slack, I choose to treat
FTB as an I(1) variable.
Finally, both the unemployment rate and the interest rate show up as I(1), even though I
expect these variables to be I(0). For the unemployment rate, the stock-interpretation makes
good sense, such that accepting the I(1) label seems sensible. At the same time, one would
expect the unemployment rate to act as a stationary variable over a longer sample, but that it is
an I(1) variable in our time window seems quite clear from Figure B.5. My plan is in any case
to include Du as a proxy for income uncertainty, making the I(1) interpretation unproblematic.
Looking at Figure B.6 it is also hard to argue against the I(1) conclusion for the interest rate.
Neither this is a severe problem. The main argument for bringing i into my analysis is to
capture the cash-flow effect from changes in the interest rate level; r is included to take care of
inter-temporal substitution and the cost of loans. Hence, I might as well include Di to capture
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the cash-flow effect, avoiding the problem of using an I(1) variable in the short-run dynamics
(confer the discussion in Chapter 4).
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Figure B.1: The development of housing wealth to income and its growth rate (left panels) and
the correlograms for the respective series (right panels).
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Figure B.2: The development of secured debt and its growth rate (left panels) and the correlo-
grams for the respective series (right panels).
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Figure B.3: The development of secured debt over income and its growth rate (left panels) and
the correlograms for the respective series (right panels).
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Figure B.5: The development of the unemployment rate and its quarterly change (left panels)
and the correlograms for the respective series (right panels).
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Figure B.6: The development of the interest rate and its quarterly change (left panels) and the
correlograms for the respective series (right panels).
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C Derivations
Before deriving any results, let us define what is called ML equations in Stata, which is a way
of simplifying the syntax in a program. We define:
q1t =F01zt (C.1)
q2t =F02zt (C.2)
q3t = B02ct 1 (C.3)
q4t = g˜ (C.4)
q5t = s11 (C.5)
q6t = s12 (C.6)
q7t = s22 (C.7)
The reason for defining these q ’s is to simplify for instance the coding of the gradient. In
a typical program you will only have to code the derivatives with respect to qit , and special
Stata commands are developed to multiply with the correct variable vector and sum over all t.
The usefulness of this syntax therefore becomes more clear as soon as you try to program these
results in Stata.
C.1 Gradient of the log likelihood function
I want the vector containing the derivatives of the likelihood function in (5.7). Using our ML-
equations notation we see that the gradient is given as:
g=å
t
0BBBBBBBBBBB@
g1tzt
g2tzt
g3tct
g4t
g5t
g6t
g7t
1CCCCCCCCCCCA
(C.8)
where git = ¶ lnLt¶qit for i = 1;2; :::;7. Hence the search for the gradient is reduced to the job of
just finding these 7 derivatives.
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For the first 4 elements we find:
g1t = s11r1t +s12r2t
g2t = s12r1t +s22r2t
g3t = g1t +q4tg2t
g4t = q3tg2t
where si j is the (i; j)th element of W and s i j is the (i; j)th element of W 1 (i; j = 1;2). In our
two-equation case we have:
¶saa
¶saa
= saasaa
¶saa
¶s12
= 2saas12
¶s12
¶saa
= saas12
¶saa
¶sbb
= s12s12
¶s12
¶s12
= s11s22 s12s12
for a;b= 1;2, making the last three elements of the gradient defined as:
g5t =
1
2
 
(s11r1t)2+(s12r2t)2+2s11s12r1tr2t s11

g6t = s11s12r21t +s
22s12r22t +(s
11s22+s12s12)r1tr2t s12
g7t =
1
2
 
(s22r2t)2+(s12r1t)2+2s22s12r1tr2t s22

Insert for all the git elements into (C.8) to get:
g=å
t
0BBBBBBBBBBB@
(s11r1t +s12r2t)zt
(s12r1t +s22r2t)zt 
s11r1t +s12r2t +q4t(s12r1t +s22r2t)

ct
q3t(s12r1t +s22r2t)
1
2
 
(s11r1t)2+(s12r2t)2+2s11s12r1tr2t s11

s11s12r21t +s
22s12r22t +(s
11s22+s12s12)r1tr2t s12
1
2
 
(s22r2t)2+(s12r1t)2+2s22s12r1tr2t s22

1CCCCCCCCCCCA
(C.9)
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C.2 Hessian of the likelihood function
We need the matrix containing all the cross derivatives of the likelihood function in (5.7). I find
that the Hessian is given as:
H =å
t
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
zt
¶g1t
¶F01
0
: : : : : :
zt
¶g1t
¶F02
0
zt
¶g2t
¶F02
0
: : : : :
zt
¶g1t
¶B02
0
zt
¶g2t
¶B02
0
ct
¶g3t
¶B02
0
: : : :
zt
¶g1t
¶ g˜
0
zt
¶g2t
¶ g˜
0
ct
¶g3t
¶ g˜
0 ¶g4t
¶ g˜
0
: : :
zt
¶g1t
¶s11
0
zt
¶g2t
¶s11
0
ct
¶g3t
¶s11
0 ¶g4t
¶s11
0 ¶g5t
¶s11
0
: :
zt
¶g1t
¶s12
0
zt
¶g2t
¶s12
0
ct
¶g3t
¶s12
0 ¶g4t
¶s12
0 ¶g5t
¶s12
0 ¶g6t
¶s12
0
:
zt
¶g1t
¶s22
0
zt
¶g2t
¶s22
0
ct
¶g3t
¶s22
0 ¶g4t
¶s22
0 ¶g5t
¶s22
0 ¶g6t
¶s22
0 ¶g7t
¶s22
0
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
(C.10)
where ¶git¶l 0 is a vector of the same dimension as l containing the derivative of git with respect
to all the elements of l . We must find all these derivatives:
¶g1t
¶F01
= s11zt
¶g1t
¶F02
= s12zt
¶g1t
¶B02
= (s11+q4ts12)ct
¶g1t
¶ g˜
= q3ts12
¶g1t
¶s11
= s11g1t
¶g1t
¶s12
= s12g1t s11g2t
¶g1t
¶s22
= s12g2t
¶g2t
¶F02
= s22zt
¶g2t
¶B02
= (q4ts22+s12)ct
¶g2t
¶ g˜
= q3ts22
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¶g2t
¶s11
= s12g1t
¶g2t
¶s12
= s22g1t s12g2t
¶g2t
¶s22
= s22g2t
¶g3t
¶B02
= (s11+2q4ts12+q 24ts22)ct
¶g3t
¶ g˜
= q3ts12 q3tq4ts22+g2t
¶g3t
¶s11
= (s11+q4ts12)g1t
¶g3t
¶s12
= (s12+q4ts22)g1t +(s11+q4ts12)g2t
¶g3t
¶s22
= (s12+q4ts22)g2t
¶g4t
¶ g˜
= q 23ts22
¶g4t
¶s11
= q3ts12g1t
¶g4t
¶s12
= q3t(s22g1t +s12g2t)
¶g4t
¶s22
= q3ts22g2t
¶g5t
¶s11
= 2s11g5t  12s
11s11
¶g5t
¶s12
= 2s12g5t s11g6t s11s12
¶g5t
¶s22
= 2s12g6t  12s
12s12
¶g6t
¶s12
= 2s12g6t s11g7t s22g5t  (s11s22+s12s12)
¶g6t
¶s22
= s22g6t s12g7t s22s12
¶g7t
¶s22
= 2s22g7t  12s
22s22
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When we insert all these expressions in (C.10) we get
H =å
t
Ht (C.11)
where we have:
Ht =
0BBBBBBBBBBB@
h11tztz0t : : : : : :
h21tztz0t h22tztz0t : : : : :
h31tctz0t h32tctz0t h33tc0tct : : : :
h41tzt h42tzt h43tct h44t : : :
h51tzt h52tzt h53tct h54t h55t : :
h61tzt h62tzt h63tct h64t h65t h66t :
h71tzt h72tzt h73tct h74t h75t h76t h77t
1CCCCCCCCCCCA
(C.12)
with elements hi jt defined as:
h11t = s11 (C.13)
h21t = s12 (C.14)
h31t = s11 q4ts12 (C.15)
h41t = q3ts12 (C.16)
h51t = s11g1t (C.17)
h61t = s12g1t s11g2t (C.18)
h71t = s12g2t (C.19)
h22t = s22 (C.20)
h32t = q4ts22 s12 (C.21)
h42t = q3ts22 (C.22)
h52t = s12g1t (C.23)
h62t = s22g1t s12g2t (C.24)
h72t = s22g2t (C.25)
h33t = s11 2q4ts12 q 24ts22 (C.26)
h43t = q3ts12 q3tq4ts22+g2t (C.27)
h53t = (s11+q4ts12)g1t (C.28)
h63t = 

(s12+q4ts22)g1t +(s11+q4ts12)g2t

(C.29)
h73t = (s12+q4ts22)g2t (C.30)
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h44t = q 23ts22 (C.31)
h54t = q3ts12g1t (C.32)
h64t = q3t(s22g1t +s12g2t) (C.33)
h74t = q3ts22g2t (C.34)
h55t = 2s11g5t  12s
11s11 (C.35)
h65t = 2s12g5t s11g6t s11s12 (C.36)
h75t = 2s12g6t  12s
12s12 (C.37)
h66t = 2s12g6t s11g7t s22g5t  (s11s22+s12s12) (C.38)
h76t = s22g6t s12g7t s22s12 (C.39)
h77t = 2s22g7t  12s
22s22 (C.40)
C.3 Gradient of the concentrated likelihood
We need the gradient of the likelihood function in (5.11). Similar to the previous case, the
gradient is:
gb =å
t
0BBBB@
gb1tzt
gb2tzt
gb3tct
gb4t
1CCCCA (C.41)
where gb it =
¶ lnLb
¶qit . Let us find these elements.
First, I denote the (a;b)th element ofW as wab, and the (a;b)th element of the inverse ofW
as wab. wab is thus defined as:
wab =
1
T åt
ratrbt
for a;b= 1;2. I differentiate jW j with respect to qt , the vector of all qi’s at time t:
¶ jW j
¶qt
=
¶w11
¶qt
w22+
¶w22
¶qt
w11 2¶w12¶qt w12
If we now consider the whole likelihood function we see that:
¶ lnLb
¶qt
= T
2
1
jW j
¶ jW j
¶qt
making
¶ lnLb
¶qt
= T
2

¶w11
¶qt
w11+
¶w22
¶qt
w22+2
¶w12
¶qt
w12

76
The various derivatives are given as:
¶w11
¶qt
=  2
T
r1t
0BBBB@
1
0
1
0
1CCCCA
¶w22
¶qt
=  2
T
r2t
0BBBB@
0
1
q4t
q3t
1CCCCA
¶w12
¶qt
=  1
T
r1t
0BBBB@
0
1
q4t
q3t
1CCCCA  1T r2t
0BBBB@
1
0
1
0
1CCCCA
Combining these results we get
gb =å
t
0BBBB@
(w11r1t +w12r2t)zt
(w12r1t +w22r2t)zt 
(w11+q4tw12)r1t +(q4tw22+w12)r2t

ct
q3tw12r1t +q3tw22r2t
1CCCCA (C.42)
C.4 Hessian of the concentrated likelihood
We want the matrix containing all the cross derivatives of the concentrated likelihood function
defined in (5.11). The Hessian takes the form of a smaller version of (C.10):
Hb =å
t
0BBBBBBB@
zt
¶gb1t
¶F01
0
: : :
zt
¶gb1t
¶F02
0
zt
¶gb2t
¶F02
0
: :
zt
¶gb1t
¶B02
0
zt
¶gb2t
¶B02
0
ct
¶gb3t
¶B02
0
:
zt
¶gb1t
¶ g˜
0
zt
¶gb2t
¶ g˜
0
ct
¶gb3t
¶ g˜
0 ¶gb4t
¶ g˜
0
1CCCCCCCA
where
¶gb it
¶l 0 is a vector of the same dimension as l containing the derivative of gb it with respect
to all the elements of l . In contrast to the case with the standard likelihood-function, these
derivatives will take a quite complicated form, but below we will show an approximation we
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will use. For gb1t we find:
¶gb1t
¶F01
= w11zt + ¶w
11
¶F01
r1t +
¶w12
¶F01
r2t
¶gb1t
¶F02
= w12zt + ¶w
11
¶F02
r1t +
¶w12
¶F02
r2t
¶gb1t
¶B02
= (w11+w12g˜)ct + ¶w
11
¶B02
r1t +
¶w12
¶B02
r2t
¶gb1t
¶ g˜
= w12q3t + ¶w
11
¶ g˜
r1t +
¶w12
¶ g˜
r2t
where now ¶w
ab
¶l 0 is a vector of the same dimension as l containing the derivative of g
ab with
respect to all the elements of l . A similar pattern follows for gb2t :
¶gb2t
¶F02
= w22zt + ¶w
22
¶F02
r2t +
¶w12
¶F02
r1t
¶gb2t
¶B02
= (w12+w22g˜)ct + ¶w
22
¶B02
r2t +
¶w12
¶B02
r1t
¶gb2t
¶ g˜
= w22q3t + ¶w
22
¶ g˜
r2t +
¶w12
¶ g˜
r1t
Since gb3t and gb4t are functions of the two first we get:
¶gb3t
¶B02
=
¶gb1t
¶B02
+ g˜
¶gb2t
¶B02
¶gb3t
¶ g˜
=
¶gb1t
¶ g˜
+ g˜
¶gb2t
¶ g˜
+gb2t
¶gb4t
¶ g˜
= q3t
¶gb2t
¶ g˜
I will not calculate the exact Hessian. Instead I will use an approximation, following Gould,
Pitblado, and Sribney (2003) which decides to ignore all the ¶w
ab
¶l 0 terms as these go to zero at
the same rate as the elements of the gradient. What I then end up with is
Hb =å
t
Hb t (C.43)
where
Hb t =
0BBBB@
hb11tztz0t : : :
hb21tztz0t hb22tztz0t : :
hb31tctz0t hb32tctz0t hb33tctc0t :
hb41tzt hb42tzt hb43tct hb44t
1CCCCA
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with elements hb i j given as:
hb11 = w11 (C.44)
hb21t = w12 (C.45)
hb31t = (w11+w12q4t) (C.46)
hb41t = w12q3t (C.47)
hb22t = w22 (C.48)
hb32t = (w12+w22q4t) (C.49)
hb42t = w22q3t (C.50)
hb33t = (w11+2w12q4t +w22q 24t) (C.51)
hb43t = w22(q3tq4t  r2t) w12(q3t  r1t) (C.52)
hb44t = w22q 23t (C.53)
C.5 Gradient of the gamma-concentrated likelihood
When deriving the gradient of the likelihood function in (5.14) we will attack the problem more
directly than what we did in the previous two cases. The gradient is:
gbg =
0BBB@
¶ lnLbg
¶F01
¶ lnLbg
¶F02
¶ lnLbg
¶B02
1CCCA (C.54)
with
¶ lnLbg
¶l 0
= T
2
1
jW j
¶ jW j
¶l 0
(C.55)
Let us now denote the derivatives of A, B, and jW j with respect to the transpose of the
coefficient vector of ML equation i as Ai, Bi and Wi, respectively. These derivatives will be
functions of the terms sabi, which are the derivatives of sab with respect to the transpose of the
coefficient vector of equation i. We find that:
Wi =
1
T 2
 
s11is22+ s22is11 2s21is21 2g˜Ai+ g˜2Bi

(C.56)
Ai = s11is32+ s32is11  s31is21  s21is31 (C.57)
Bi = s11is33+ s33is11 2s31is31 (C.58)
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for i= 1;2;3 and
s111 = 2å
t
r1tzt
s112 = 0kz
s113 = 2å
t
r1tct
s211 = å
t
rˆ2tzt
s212 = å
t
r1tzt
s213 = å
t
rˆ2tct
s221 = 0kz
s222 = 2å
t
rˆ2tzt
s223 = 0kc
s311 = å
t
q3tzt
s312 = 0kz
s313 =å
t
(r1t q3t)ct
s321 = 0kz
s322 = å
t
q3tzt
s323 =å
t
rˆ2tct
s331 = 0kz
s332 = 0kz
s333 = 2å
t
q3tct
Plug these results into (C.54) to get the full gradient.
C.6 Hessian of the gamma-concentrated likelihood
The Hessian will take the form:
Hbg =
0BBB@
¶ 2 lnLbg
¶F1¶F01
: :
¶ 2 lnLbg
¶F2¶F01
¶ 2 lnLbg
¶F2¶F02
:
¶ 2 lnLbg
¶B2¶F01
¶ 2 lnLbg
¶B2¶F02
¶ 2 lnLbg
¶B2¶B02
1CCCA (C.59)
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The various sub-matrices in the Hessian are given as:
¶ 2 lnLbg
¶li¶l 0j
= T
2
1
jW j
 
¶ 2jW j
¶li¶l 0j
  1jW j
¶ jW j
¶l 0i
¶ jW j
¶l j
!
(C.60)
Let nowWi j, Ai j and Bi j denote the derivatives ofWi, Ai and Bi with respect to the coefficient
vector of equation j, while Gi is the derivative of g˜ML with respect to the transpose of the
coefficient vector of equation i. With formulas for these, the Hessian is also defined. We have:
Wi j =
1
T 2
(s11i js22+ s11is022 j+ s22i js11+ s22is
0
11 j
 2s21i js21 2s21is021 j
 2(Ai  g˜Bi)G0j 2g˜Ai j+ g˜2Bi j) (C.61)
Gi = (Ai  g˜Bi)=B (C.62)
Ai j = s11i js32+ s11is032 j+ s32i js11+ s32is
0
11 j
  s31i js21  s31is021 j  s21i js31  s21is031 j (C.63)
Bi j = s11i js33+ s11is033 j+ s33i js11+ s33is
0
11 j
 2s31i js31 2s31is031 j (C.64)
for i; j = 1;2;3 and where si jkl is the derivative of si jk with respect to the coefficient vector of
equation l (explicit formulas for these are superfluous) for k; l = 1;2;3.
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